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I. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
On November 20, 2003, the Ogden Civil Service Commission (the
"Commission") issued an opinion (the "First Decision") reversing the termination
of Captain Daniel Harmon ("Harmon") from the Ogden City Fire Department (the
"Department" or "OFD"). See First Decision, R. 164-79. Ogden City petitioned
the Utah Court of Appeals for review of the First Decision. R. 180-82. On June
16, 2006, the Court of Appeals issued a decision ("Harmon /") reversing the First
Decision and remanding the matter to the Commission for further consideration.
R. 3367-73 (Ogden City Corp. v. Harmon, 2005 Utah App 274, 116 P.3d 973).
On remand, the Commission issued a decision on April 13, 2006 ("Remand
Order"), joined by two of the three Commissioners, finding that Harmon's
termination was proper based on the seven incidents of misconduct which are at
issue in this matter. R. 3481-96. In a concurring opinion, the third Commissioner
agreed that termination was proper based on the seven incidents plus Harmon's
"misconduct" in failing to "acknowledge what he had done," i.e., that he was
deceitful. R. 3469-72.
Harmon timely filed a Petition for Review on May 12, 2006. See Petition
for Review, Ex. A in Addendum of this Brief. This Court has jurisdiction under
Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1012.5 and Utah R.App.P. 14.
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II. ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Issue: Should the factual allegations as to Harmon's dishonesty be

summarily affirmed due to his failure to marshal the evidence on appeal?
Standard of Review: "A party challenging a fact finding must first
marshal all record evidence that supports the challenged finding." Utah R.App.P.
24(a)(9); Whitear v. Labor Comm'n, 973 P.2d 982, 984 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). If
an appellant fails to marshal evidence, the appellate court will not address a
challenge to factual findings and must assume they are correct. Id. at 985; see also
Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 312 (Utah 1998).
2.

Issue: Has Harmon waived issues related to alleged warnings under

Garrity v. State of New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967), by failing to raise them to the
Commission on remand, and has he misinterpreted Garrity!
Standard of Review: Failure to raise an issue below results in
waiver of any objections related to that issue. Ashcroft v. Industrial Comm'n, 855
P.2d 267, 268-69 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied, 868 P.2d 95 (Utah 1993); see also
Joseph v. Salt Lake City Civil Serv. Comm'n, 2002 UT App 254, f 18, 53 P.3d 11
(refusing to address issues not raised to civil service commission). "[I]t is unfair
to fault the trial court for failing to rule correctly on an issue it was never given the
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opportunity to consider." State v. Burns, 2000 UT 56, f 17, 4 P.3d 795.
Interpretation of Garrity is a question of law.
Preservation of Issue: The sole issue remanded to the Commission
for determination is whether the sanction of dismissal is warranted based on the
facts of the case, i.e., whether termination is appropriate to the offense(s). Ogden
City Corp. v. Harmon, 2005 UT App 274, f 16, 116 P.2d 973. As part of its
review, the Commission was instructed to address the issue regarding Harmon's
dishonesty. Id. f 14. The sole reference to Garrity in Harmon's brief to the
Commission on remand is a vague comment in response to the City's Statement of
Facts. See R. 3453. In the argument section of his brief to the Commission,
Harmon makes no reference to Garrity. See R. 3452-59. Since Harmon's counsel
informed the Commission that he would not appear for oral argument, no oral
argument was held and, as a result, Harmon could not have raised any issue
regarding Garrity in oral argument. See R. 3482.
3.

Issue: Should the Commission's decision be affirmed due to

Harmon's failure to marshal evidence as to any alleged mitigating factors?
Standard of Review: Factors related to mitigation are factual issues.
"A party challenging a fact finding must first marshal all record evidence that
supports the challenged finding." Utah R.App.P. 24(a)(9); Whitear, 973 P.2d at
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984. If an appellant fails to marshal evidence, the appellate court will not address
a challenge to factual findings and must assume they are correct. Id. at 985.
4.

Issue: Did the Commission properly determine that the decision to

terminate Harmon should be affirmed?
Standard of Review. This is a question of law. The second task of
a Commission is to determine whether the discipline imposed was appropriate.
Kelly v. Salt Lake City Civil Serv. Comm'n, 2000 UT App 235, f 16, 8 P.3d 1048.
The "discipline imposed for employee misconduct is within the sound discretion
of the Chief," with the question and standard for the Chiefs disciplinary decision
being whether the Chief abused his/her discretion. Lucas v. Civil Serv. Comm'n,
949 P.2d 746, 761 (Utah Ct. App. 1997); accord, Kelly, 2000 UT App 235, f 22,
8 P.3d 1048. The Chief "exceeds the scope of his discretion if the punishment
imposed is in excess of 'the range of sanctions permitted by statute or regulation,
or if, in light of all the circumstances, the punishment is disproportionate to the
offense." Lucas, 949 P.2d at 761. "If a penalty is so harsh as to constitute an
abuse, rather than an exercise of discretion, it cannot be allowed to stand." Id.
(citing Boyce v. United States, 543 F.2d 1290, 1295 (Ct. CI. 1976)). The appellate
court reviews "the sanction in light of all the circumstances underlying the
termination." Id. at f 24.
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5.

Issue: Do Utah appellate courts have original jurisdiction over

claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983?
Standard of Review: Jurisdictional questions are questions of law.
See Xiao Yang Li v. University of Utah, 2006 UT 57, f 7, 144 P.3d 1142.
6.

Issue: Should the Court address Harmon's 42 U.S.C. § 1983

argument, even though no § 1983 claim was ever raised or asserted below?
Standard of Review: Utah appellate courts will refuse to address a
new claim that was not raised below. Simmons v. Farmers Ins. Group, 877 P.2d
1255, 1259 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (refusing to address claim for breach of duty of
good faith and fair dealing, where claim not raised below). Utah appellate courts
will refuse to address an issue where the "[appellate] brief wholly lacks legal
analysis and authority to support... [the] argument." State v. Wareham, 772 P.2d
960, 966 (Utah 1989).
III. DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
1.

Constitution of the United States of America, Amendment XIV.

2.

Constitution of Utah, Art. I, Sec. 7.

IV. STATUTES AND RULES OF CENTRAL IMPORTANCE
Copies of policies, procedures, statutes, and rules of central importance to
this appeal are included in Exhibit B of the Addendum to this Brief.
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V. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

NATURE OF THE CASE, COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS, AND
DISPOSITION BELOW.

1.

BACKGROUND

On June 16, 2005, the Utah Court of Appeals issued a decision in Case
No. 20031030CA, which resolved the City's appeal of the Commission's
November 20, 2003, decision to reverse OFD Chief Mike Mathieu's decision to
terminate Harmon. See Harmon I. The Court remanded with instructions as to
what the Commission should consider on remand. See id.
At a hearing before the Commission on November 10, 2005, counsel for
Harmon as well as counsel for the City agreed that no further evidence would be
considered on remand, and that the record provided to the Court of Appeals would
be the record on remand. See R. 3482, 3442 n.l (Harmon's Brf. on Remand).
After that stipulation, the Commission then ordered the parties to file briefs
addressing the applicable issues simultaneously on the same day, January 3, 2006,
and the parties agreed (and the Commission ordered) that neither side would be
permitted to file any responsive or opposition briefs. R. 3482. The City timely
filed a brief on January 3, 2006, addressing what it believed to be the issues on
remand. Id.; see City's Remand Brf., Ex. C in Addendum to this Brief. Harmon
did not file a brief at that time. Id. Instead, he filed an unauthorized, late brief on
6

January 24, 2006, which opposed and responded to the City's timely-filed brief.
For the most part, Harmon's brief on remand contains no citations to the record.
See R. 3452-59. The Commission considered Harmon's brief over the City's
objection. Id.
After the Commission announced the date for oral argument, Harmon's
counsel informed the Commission that he would not appear, with the result that
the Commission did not allow oral argument by either party. See R. 3482.
2.

ISSUES ON REMAND

Harmon I instructed the Commission to proceed as follows on remand:
First, the Court instructed that the Commission should have accepted as
factual {i.e., as supporting the charges) all of the following incidents, and further
instructed that all of these incidents should have been included in the
Commission's assessment of Chief Mathieu's termination decision:
(a)

the Shower Incident where Harmon urinated into a shower stall where
another OFD employee was showering;

(b)

the Zucchini Incident where Harmon showed a zucchini to a female
subordinate and asked "Is this big enough?";

(c)

that throughout his tenure as a Captain, Harmon tolerated and
participated in a form of sexually-oriented horseplay among male
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firefighters where fully clothed firefighters would "imitate sexual
intercourse with each other" ("Horseplay Incidents");
(d)

the MDA Incident where Harmon "coordinated a fund-raising event"
"in which he permitted female entertainers to pose topless with
firefighters";

(e)

the Weedkiller Incident where Harmon and two other firefighters
urinated into a bottle, which a retired battalion chief later picked up
believing it to be the weedkiller Harmon had promised to him;

(f)

the Drafting Pit Incident, where Harmon publicly urinated into a
drafting pit (water reservoir) being used by his and another fire crew.

See Harmon /, 2005 UT App 274, ff 11-15, 116 P.3d 973.
Second, the Court instructed the Commission to "address each of the
grounds for termination cited by the department head," including the "dishonesty"
issue, i.e., that Chief Mathieu had determined Harmon had been "untruthful or
dishonest in responding to questions in the December 11, 2000 Fire Department
predetermination hearing." Id. at % 14. Harmon I states that "[a]n allegation of
dishonesty, if proven, would violate Fire Department regulations and could
possibly add further support to the charges against Harmon." Id.
Third, the Commission was instructed that it "must affirm the sanction [of
dismissal] if it is (1) appropriate to the offense and (2) consistent with previous
8

sanctions imposed by the department." Id. at f 16. Harmon I further instructed
that, since the Commission had already determined there was no inconsistency and
Harmon has offered no evidence of inconsistency, the Commission should not
revisit that issue on remand. Id. As a result, Harmon I concluded that the
"question of severity [of discipline] is of primary importance in this case." Id.
In short, the main issue to be decided by the Commission on remand was
whether the disciplinary decision was appropriate as to severity.
3.

COMMISSION'S REMAND DECISION.

On April 13, 2006, the Commission issued its Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law and Order ("Remand Order") (R. 3481-96). The Remand
Order was signed by Commissioner A.K. Greenwood and Commissioner Jeremy
Taylor. R. 3496. The Remand Order holds that Chief Mathieu's termination of
Harmon was appropriate and proportional in light of the Shower, Zucchini,
Horseplay, Drafting Pit, Weedkiller, MDA, and the "failure to attend meetings"
incidents alone ("seven incidents"), as weighed against mitigating circumstances
raised by Harmon. See Remand Order, R. 3481-96; 3483 n.3. The Remand Order
further states that Commissioners Greenwood and Taylor "agree that the evidence
shows that Harmon displayed an intent to deceive Chief Mathieu about the
Weedkiller Incident, and that this dishonesty issue would justify dismissal with or
without combining it with the other seven incidents." R. 3483 n.l.
9

The third commissioner, John R. Lemke, concurred in Chief Mathieu's
decision to terminate Harmon. R. 3469-72 ("Lemke Concurring Opinion").
However, he based his decision on the seven incidents of misconduct combined
with Harmon's conduct in the Second Predetermination hearing of "failing to
acknowledge" what he had done during the Weedkiller Incident:
The question of what is the appropriate punishment for a group of
incidents over an extended period is difficult. Although I believe that
the seven misconduct incidents warrant demotion rather than
termination, I also believe that Harmon's actions in the Second
Predetermination Hearing are misconduct and can be considered in
determining the appropriate punishment. His actions show he lacked
the judgment to appraise his situation. He knew that he was about to
be punished and that the punishment was likely to be at least
demotion, but yet he continued to play games with the Chief and
could not bring himself to acknowledge what he had done. This is
much less than is to be expected from a Captain with twenty years of
service and it raises serious concerns about Harmon's trustworthiness.
It was a legitimate factor in the Chief's termination decision and, I
believe, sufficiently serious that when added to the other misconduct
can support termination. Therefore, I join the majority in finding that
Harmon's misconduct justified termination.
R. 3472.
B.

FACTS RELEVANT TO HONESTY ISSUE.
Harmon I instructed that the Horseplay, Shower, Zucchini, MDA, Drafting

Pit, Weedkiller, and failure to attend meetings incidents occurred as stated, so that
there was no factual issue the Commission was required to determine in those
situations. The sole factual issue referred to the Commission on remand was
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whether Harmon had been dishonest in his responses to Chief Mathieu regarding
the Weedkiller Incident. To challenge a factual finding on appeal, the petitioner
must marshal the evidence supporting the Commission's factual findings, and then
show that despite these facts, and in light of conflicting or contradictory evidence,
the findings are not supported by substantial evidence. Whitear, 973 P.2d at 984;
Utah R.App.P. 24(a)(9). Since Harmon has not marshaled the evidence as to this
factual issue, the City does so as follows.
1.

FACTS SUPPORTING NO DISHONEST ANSWER.

1.

Harmon testified that his denial in his letter about the Weedkiller

Incident also applied to questions asked in the Second Predetermination Hearing.
R. 2763-64.
2.

Harmon testified he did not provide weedkiller as urine to a Battalion

Chief because: (1) the Battalion Chief was actually retired and was not currently a
Battalion Chief at the time; and (2) because what he actually provided was "urine
as weedkiller," not "weedkiller as urine." R. 152-53, 2768.
3.

Harmon testified that he answered the Weedkiller questions correctly

because Chief Mathieu had mixed up his use of the words "urine" and
"weedkiller." R. 2769.
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4.

Harmon testified that a superior is entitled to a straight answer to a

question and that he thought his denial was a straight answer to questions about
the Weedkiller Incident. R. 2773.
2.

FACTS SUPPORTING DISHONEST ANSWER.

1.

In the Second Predetermination Hearing, Chief Mathieu asked

Harmon the following about the Weedkiller Incident:
It has been reported to me that your former Battalion Chief asked for
some of that and in so doing, instead of providing weed killer, you
provided him urine. Did that occur?
R. 348. Harmon answered "[m]y response is in that letter also." R. 348.
Harmon's response in the letter was "I deny." See R. 345.
2.

Harmon admitted in the Commission Hearing that he had done the

things that he had denied doing in response to Chief Mathieu's question. See
2708-11, 2773-75. He testified that he saw urinating into the bottle as "a fire
house joke" and a "camaraderie building experience" (R. 2774-75), that he
"completely approved of [the incident] up to the point [Thompson] received it,"
and that his only culpability was forgetting to remove the bottle before Thompson
got it (R. 2776-77). He testified that he joked afterwards about Thompson
"walking around his yard spraying urine on his lawn." R. 2778.
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3.

Chief Mathieu testified that when he questioned Harmon about the

Weedkiller Incident in the Second Predetermination Hearing, he knew the incident
occurred (R. 1737-38) and thus knew Harmon was not honest in response (id.).
C.

FACTS RELEVANT TO PROPORTIONALITY OF DISCIPLINE.
1.

HARMON'S WORK PERFORMANCE.

1.

Harmon was hired by the City as a firefighter on September 10, 1979.

R. 143. He became a captain on March 2, 1991, and held that position until he
was terminated on December 15, 2000. R. 431.
2.

As a member of OFD, Harmon was trained in preventing sexual

harassment, and signed acknowledgments of receipt of sexual harassment
prevention information and/or having received training on the City's "No
Harassment Policy" numerous times. R. 364-69 (acknowledgments signed by
Harmon 12/18/93; 12/29/94; 8/20/96; 10/28/98; 9/8/99).
3.

Harmon's annual employee evaluations from February 17, 1991,

through March 2000, reflect that he typically received mid-range marks, and often
was cautioned and/or received low marks because he failed to stay on-task and had
problems in his personal relations with co-workers. See R. 375-471 (evaluations);
see also R. 1773-2022 (Comm. Hrg. Trans.).
4.

From approximately 1995 through 2000, Harmon's performance

deteriorated. On December 13, 1995, he received a Second Written Warning
13

cautioning him about his poor work performance, inefficient work habits, failure
to discipline subordinates, conflicts with peer supervisors, and failure to stay ontask including failing to provide timely evaluations. R. 278, 388.
5.

Harmon's annual evaluations show similar problems. His 1996

annual evaluation notes lie has "trouble working with others on a mutual respect
basis," and he received "marginal" scores on that evaluation in leadership,
planning/organization, personnel management/interpersonal skills, meeting
schedules/utilizing resources, and flexibility/adaptability/initiative. R. 403-06.
6.

Harmon's March 3, 1997 annual evaluation expressed concerns with

his problems in "sizing up" and prioritizing tasks, and the evaluator was concerned
about his reliability. R. 439.
7.

In his March 3, 1998, annual evaluation, Harmon received "marginal"

in the categories of planning/organization, and meeting schedules/utilizing
resources. See R. 446-54.
8.

In Harmon's March 2, 2000, evaluation, the evaluator stated he had

good leadership traits and his crew liked him, but that his crew did not trust him
because he had problems fulfilling his duties. R. 465.
9.

Harmon scored marginal on the 2000 evaluation for productivity/

efficiency, and for meeting schedules/utilizing resources. R. 466-67.
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10.

On April 19, 1998, Harmon was counseled about leaving his assigned

location at a fire without informing the Incident Commander. R. 444; R. 2014.
11.

From June 1999 to November 2000, Harmon failed to attend:
(a)

a June 10, 1999, workgroup leaders meeting (he was Team

Leader) because he claimed that he "spaced it" (R. 458);
(b)

a August 17, 1999, CPR class for reservists that he had

scheduled and where he was an instructor (R. 289);
(c)

a September 18, 1999, Reserve Corps meeting that he had set

up as the Team Leader (R. 289);
(d)

a November 14, 2000 class he was supposed to teach, which

had been set for eight months and was shown on posted yearly and monthly
calendars (R. 473-74).
12.

On November 11, 1999, Harmon received a Notice of Caution for

missing the 1999 meetings, and was removed as Team Leader. R. 289.
2.

HARMON'S CULPABILITY.

13.

Harmon admitted he knew the women preparing the meal at the MDA

event would be wearing swimsuits, and when he saw that one of them had changed
into a thong bikini bottom to pose for photos, he fetched his Captain's helmet from
the ambulance he was driving so she could pose with it. R. 494-95,498.
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14.

While discussing photos taken of the woman at the MDA event,

Harmon said he used a disposable camera to "get a butt shot of her standing with
her butt toward the camera" while she was wearing his helmet. R. 498.
15.

Regarding the MDA event, Harmon said he later was surprised to see

the woman had taken off her bikini top and was posing for photos while lying on a
cot in the ambulance with firemen sitting on the squad bench around her. R. 500.
He stated that he "should have stopped it right there," but did not because he was
"enthused by it also." Id. He told investigators that he instead left (R. 501), and
that he later "heard that she had some more pictures taken downstairs and that they
were worse than the pictures upstairs" (R. 508).
16.

Harmon told investigators that he led the effort to hide what had

taken place at the MDA event, and that he made sure they got "rid of the frigging
film." R. 504-06; 1588-59. He admitted to the Commission that he led the effort
to get rid of the photos. R. 2657, 2659.
17.

At the first predetermination hearing, Harmon admitted it was not

appropriate for him "as a Captain, as a supervisor," to participate in an act of dryhumping other firefighters" and that he had done that. R. 328.
18.

Deputy Chief Chamberlain testified at the Commission Hearing that

Harmon admitted participating in the dry-humping conduct, and that "as a
supervisor, he was failing to stop that conduct amongst his subordinates," and that
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Harmon " 'viewed this as appropriate behavior as long as it was male to male but
wrong if male to female." R. 1604-06. Chamberlain agreed investigators found
this a "pattern behavior related to poor judgment and poor leadership." R. 1606.
19.

The Affidavit of the woman involved in the Zucchini Incident was

read at the Commission Hearing. This stated: "I have observed Captain Harmon
and members of his crew engage in dry-humping, where one person is standing
behind another person would reach into the front pockets of the forward person,
causing the forward person to bend over, after which the rear person would mimic
the pelvic thrusts of a sex act. It was considered a j o k e . . . . I have observed
Captain Harmon participate in this activity both in the rear and forward positions."
R. 2078.
20.

Other than Harmon, the woman involved in the Zucchini Incident

testified at the Hearing that she "wouldn't swear under oath" she had ever seen an
officer present during a dry-humping incident, but they might have been. R. 2477.
21.

At the Commission Hearing, James Bristow, Ogden City Human

Resources Manager, testified regarding sexual harassment training that "[w]e
basically teach employees, supervisors to keep sexual issues out of the
workplace." R. 2216.
22.

Steve Gunnell ("Gunnell") testified at the Commission Hearing that

he was taking a shower in a personal shower stall when Harmon opened the door
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and "started urinating in my shower." R. 2436. He said he has never heard of
anyone at OFD urinating into a shower where someone was showering (R. 2437),
and he "was shocked," "a little offended," and thought it "was kind of
disrespectful" (R. 2437).
23.

Chief Mathieu testified at the Commission Hearing that the training

facility where the drafting pit is located sits back onto 12th Street in Ogden and
can be seen from public view through the surrounding chain link fence. R. 1834,
1850. He responded "yes, I do" when asked by Harmon's attorney whether he
believed that Harmon's "exposing his genitals caused your other male firefighters
affront or alarm." R. 1835. He stated that "[i]t was told to me by some of the
members present that they were totally caught off guard, totally surprised, thought
it was a totally inappropriate act," and that when urinating into the drafting pit
Harmon said "I'll fill it up." R. 1837.
24.

Regarding the Drafting Pit Incident, Chief Mathieu testified at the

Commission Hearing that some firefighters said "it was bizarre and they couldn't
imagine that somebody would do that in front of them, that would just expose
themselves and urinate into the drafting pit." R. 1838. He testified that some
firefighters told him that when they were opening lids to take water out of the pit,
"Dan made a gesture, says Let me fill it up or I'll fill it up and, that's when the
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urination began." R. 1847-48; R. 2295-96. OFD trainees were present at the
drafting pit when the incident occurred. R. 1849; R. 2294.
25.

Regarding the Drafting Pit Incident, Gunnell testified at the

Commission Hearing that he was standing about four to five feet away from
Harmon, on the other side of the pit. R. 2442-43. He testified that someone
commented that the "drafting pit was getting low, and [Harmon] said that he'd
help fill it up or something like that." R. 2444. Gunnell testified he thought that
Harmon's intent was to shock (R. 2444), and that Gunnell's reaction was "I was
surprised, somewhat shocked, and just turned and walked away" (R. 2445).
Gunnell testified that another firefighter, Dennis Kennedy, appeared upset and
commented "I can't believe he did that." R. 2445, 2447.
26.

OFD firefighter Stephen Reynolds was present at the drafting pit,

standing behind a truck. R. 2561. At the Commission Hearing, he testified he did
not see Harmon urinate, but that he later refused to take the hose out of the pit
because of the urine, since he "didn't want to touch the hose." R. 2562.
27.

Harmon testified at the Commission Hearing that he urinated into the

pit because "I had to go real bad," and the restroom in the drill tower was locked
and that it is a "real pain" to get the key. R. 1277.
28.

Regarding the Weedkiller Incident, Chief Mathieu testified at the

Commission Hearing that based on what he had learned and the surrounding
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circumstances, he did not believe the urination into the bottle was intended to be a
practical joke. R. 2372. He stated that he considered Harmon's testimony in his
deposition about whether he had urinated into the bottle as "a contradiction of his
denial at the second predetermination hearing." R. 2383.
29.

Regarding the Weedkiller Incident, Harmon testified at the

Commission Hearing that he left the bottle containing urine on or under the
counter, and that he later learned that the former battalion chief had picked it up
from that place and left a $20 bill on the counter to pay him for it. R. 2709-11. He
testified that urinating into the bottle was a "symbolic act of defiance" by himself
and his crew against the battalion chief (R. 2708, 2773), and that he viewed
urinating into the bottle as "a fire house joke," and as a "camaraderie building
experience" (R. 2774-75). He testified he "completely approved of up to the point
[the battalion chief] received [the urine-filled bottle]," and that his only culpability
was not removing the bottle before the battalion chief got it. R. 2776-77. He said
he joked about the battalion chief "walking around his yard spraying urine on his
lawn." R. 2778.
3.

HARMON'S ADMISSIONS.

30.

At the first predetermination hearing, Harmon admitted he thought his

female probationary subordinate's joke about zucchini as "homewreckers" was
"somewhat" inappropriate but that he did not caution her about the "inappropriate
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nature of that joke in the workplace." R. 2143. He admitted that his own response
to the woman's comment had a sexual connotation. R. 2144.
31.

At the first predetermination hearing, Harmon admitted that as a

supervisor, he was responsible for "workplace conduct of introductory
firefighters," and that as a supervisor, he established "what is acceptable and what
is not acceptable" for his subordinates. R. 327.
32.

At the Commission Hearing, Harmon agreed: (a) "with the axiom a

leader sets up, leads by example"; (b) "that a leader is assigned and takes
responsibility . . . for his actions and is always ready to be held accountable"; and
(c) "the leader makes [] decisions based on his judgment and, therefore, is also
held accountable if something goes wrong." R. 2821-22.
33.

At the Commission Hearing, Harmon agreed that "a captain is to be

an example to his crew." R. 1257. He agreed it was his "duty as a captain to train
[a new] employee to know what is appropriate and not appropriate in the Ogden
City Fire Department." R. 1258.
34.

At the Commission Hearing, Harmon testified that the Zucchini,

Shower, and Drafting Pit Incidents were "inappropriate actions" and "stupid things
to do." R. 2832-34. He described his understanding of "sexual harassment" as
there "is no sexual harassment unless and until there is a complaint of sexual
harassment." R. 2839.
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4.

CHIEF MATHIEU'S TERMINATION DECISION.

35.

Chief Mathieu testified that in making the disciplinary decision, he

considered the offenses collectively: "In consideration, I considered all of the
offenses collectively. I didn't consider them individually." R. 1755.
36.

Chief Mathieu testified that in making his disciplinary decision, he

took into account Harmon's poor past annual performance evaluations and his past
disciplinary history. R. 1972. He also reviewed areas in evaluations where
Harmon was marked as "marginal," including with regard to staying on-task, time
management, and blaming others when criticized. See R. 1973-2022.
37.

Chief Mathieu testified at the Commission hearing that he considered

what he believed to be Harmon's dishonesty at the second predetermination
hearing in denying the Weedkiller Incident, where Chief Mathieu already had
evidence the incident had occurred. R. 2373-75. He testified he did not terminate
Harmon solely on the basis of his finding that Harmon had lied, but also on his
belief Harmon "displayed an intent to be dishonest." R. 2607-08; 2373-75.
38.

Chief Mathieu testified at the Commission Hearing that he had never

before had a situation arise where an employee was "involved in an incident that
in any way related to an employee urinating on somebody, in something, around a
place that was inappropriate," let alone three such incidents. R. 2396-97.
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39.

Chief Mathieu testified at the Commission Hearing that he made the

decision to terminate Harmon because he believed it was in the best interest of the
City and the OFD. R. 2402. He testified that he felt that "there was much more
than what was needed to terminate Dan Harmon." R. 2607-08.
V. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Court should reject Harmon's arguments and affirm the decision of the
Commission. First, there is no merit to Harmon's primary argument that the
Commission should be reversed because the Remand Order allegedly fails to
address the "honesty" issue. The Remand Order specifically addresses the honesty
issue and finds that Harmon had an intent to deceive. Moreover, even if that were
not so, Harmon failed to marshal the evidence on this issue or show how it is
legally insufficient to support the finding.
Second, Harmon's reliance on Garrity v. State of New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493
(1967), to support his argument that his termination was improper, is misplaced.
He has waived this issue by failing to raise it to the Commission on remand, and
he also misinterprets Garrity. Garrity does not, as Harmon contends, "protect[]
public employees from discharge for invoking the Fifth Amendment privilege."
Garrity stands for the proposition that when a public employee is questioned
during an investigation by the entity, the employee must answer and must answer
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truthfully, but nothing obtained in the interview can be used against the employee
in a criminal proceeding.
Third, Harmon has failed to marshal all the factual evidence as to mitigating
factors. Based on this, his appeal should be dismissed. Moreover, even if he had
marshaled the mitigating factors, he has failed to show how in comparing these
with the incidents charged against him, the Remand Order erred. Most of the
alleged mitigating factors gleaned from his brief are irrelevant or without merit.
Those few that might be mitigating are insufficient to overcome the strong
implications of Harmon's misconduct.
Fourth, there is little to mitigate Harmon's conduct. He did not have an
"exemplary service record" and the evidence of misconduct is not "tenuous." The
violations also are "directly related to the [Harmon's] official duties and
significantly impedes his . . . ability to carry out those duties," since he was a
captain and his actions were such as to seriously impact the regard in which he
would be held by co-workers and subordinates. In addition, his offenses were "of
a type that adversely affect[] the public confidence in the department," and were
such that they "undermine[d] the morale and effectiveness of the department."
The Remand Order properly affirmed Chief Mathieu's decision to terminate
Harmon, and that decision was not unreasonable or irrational. He did not act
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impulsively or without thought. He balanced the situation, and determined it was
not in the best interests of OFD to continue to employ Harmon.
Fifth, there is no merit to Harmon's request that this Court find § 1983
violations by the Commission. Utah appellate courts do not have original jurisdiction over civil claims such as § 1983 claims. Moreover, Harmon is in effect
asserting his § 1983 claims for the first time before this appellate court. He did
not raise these issues below and is attempting to, in effect, file a new § 1983 claim
before this Court for the first time. Obviously, an appellate court cannot address
the substantive merits of new claims that were never asserted below. Furthermore,
Harmon's request that this Court define the scope of § 1983 claims that can be
made against commissions under Utah law is an improper request for an advisory
opinion.
Finally, even if this Court decided to address them, Harmon's arguments as
to liberty interest, property interest, and due process should be rejected on the
merits. Liberty interest and property interest require only due process. The
evidence is clear that Harmon received all the due process to which he was entitled
and/or which he requested and agreed to use.
VI. ARGUMENT
Harmon has based his appeal on the inexplicable argument that the Remand
Order did not decide the "honesty" issue and that, as a result, the decision must be
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reversed. Interwoven in this argument are similarly inexplicable arguments that
the Remand Order is further flawed in that it fails to address Garrity, and that this
Court should determine whether these alleged failures by the Commission amount
to violations by the Commission of Harmon's rights and create § 1983 claims.
Harmon also asks this Court to issue an advisory opinion on the scope of potential
§ 1983 claims that could be made against a commission that has participated in an
appeal of an employment decision.
Harmon's arguments ignore that he failed to raise the Garrity issue to the
Commission in his brief on remand and that, because he declined to participate in
the oral argument scheduled by the Commission, the Garrity and other issues
could not have been raised orally. He also ignores that footnote 1 to the Remand
Order specifically states the majority commissioners "agree that the evidence
shows that Harmon displayed an intent to deceive Chief Mathieu about the
Weedkiller Incident." See R. 3483 n.l.
Instead, he has veered off on a tangent and gone to great lengths to
minimize the real issue here, i.e., whether his termination was appropriate under
the undisputed facts. Along this tangent, he has paused at times to raise various
arguments related to liberty interests, alleged stigmatization, alleged loss of
reputation, property interest, the Fifth Amendment "right to remain silent," alleged
failure to have a "full and fair hearing," due process, and statutes of limitations
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under Title VII. None of these arguments have any relevance whatsoever to the
issues at stake here and, for the reasons set forth in more detail below, Harmon's
appeal should be denied.
A.

HARMON FAILED TO MARSHAL THE EVIDENCE ON THE
HONESTY ISSUE, AND THE REMAND DECISION FOUND HE
"DISPLAYED AN INTENT TO DECEIVE."
Harmon's primary argument on appeal is that the Commission should be

reversed because the Remand Order fails to address the "honesty" issue. This
argument should be rejected because the Remand Order does address this issue
and, even if that were not the case, Harmon failed to marshal the evidence on this
issue or show how it is legally insufficient to support the finding.
Harmon is correct that the Remand Order joined by Commissioners
Greenwood and Taylor chose to rely on the seven incidents in affirming Chief
Mathieu's decison to terminate Harmon. However, the Remand Order also states
that Commissioners Greenwood and Taylor "agree that the evidence shows that
Harmon displayed an intent to deceive Chief Mathieu about the Weedkiller
Incident, and that this dishonesty issue would justify dismissal with or without

27

combining it with the other seven incidents."1 R. 3483 n.l. Based on this alone,
the Commission should be affirmed and Harmon's appeal denied.
Even if this were not the case, Harmon has failed to marshal the evidence on
this issue or to show how it has a "fatal flaw." "In order to challenge a court's
factual findings, an appellant must first marshal all the evidence in support of the
finding and then demonstrate that the evidence is legally insufficient to support the
finding even when viewing it in a light most favorable to the court below." Chen
v. Stewart, 2005 UT 68, <j[ 53,123 P.3d 416. "At its core, the duty to marshal
evidence contemplates that an appellant present 'every scrap of competent
evidence introduced at trial which supports the very findings the appellant resists'
and then 'ferret out a fatal flaw in the evidence,' becoming a 'devil's advocate.'"
In re E.H., 2006 UT 36, f 64, 137 P.3d 809 (citations omitted); see also Utah
R.App.P. 24(a)(9); Whitear, 973 P.2d at 984; Valcarce, 961 P.2d at 312.
It is impossible to tell from Harmon's opening brief whether he has
marshaled facts on the dishonesty issue. Moreover, he has failed to show how any
evidence on this issue, viewed in the proper light, is legally insufficient to support
'The Remand Decision's 34th Finding of Fact is "Chief Mathieu believes
that Harmon was dishonest and also displayed an intent to be dishonest at the
second predetermination hearing when Harmon denied the Weedkiller Incident."
R. 3490. The Remand Decision states that it incorporates the first 11 Factual
Findings of the first Commission decision. See R. 3483. Paragraph 10 of the
initial Findings of Fact states that Harmon's letter to Chief Mathieu denied the
Weedkiller Incident. R. 146.
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a finding of intent to deceive. Thus, the Commission's decision should be
affirmed and this appeal denied.
B.

THERE IS NO MERIT TO HARMON'S GARRITY ARGUMENT,
AND THE ARGUMENT FURTHERMORE HAS BEEN WAIVED.
The Court should reject Harmon's argument that his termination was

improper based on Garrity v. State of New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967). Harmon
makes the incorrect assertion that, under Garrity, an employee who asserts his
constitutional right against self-incrimination cannot be terminated. See Harmon's
Brf., pp. 21, 38. Harmon, however, not only failed to raise this issue with the
Commission on remand, he also misinterprets Garrity.
First, Harmon's brief to the Commission, in which he was supposed to
argue his position as to why Chief Mathieu's decision should be reversed, is
devoid of mention of Garrity except for one comment responding to f 49 in the
City's brief. In this comment, Harmon states:
There was no intent to be dishonest. In light of Garrity and pursuant
to attorney's advice, Harmon submitted a letter denying the allegation
that he, himself provided urine to a Chief falsely representing it to be
Round-Up.
R. 3453. Harmon failed even to mention Garrity in the argument portion of his
brief (see R. 3442-59, passim), and could not have argued it orally to the
Commission because his counsel declined to appear for oral argument. He
therefore has waived this issue and the Court should not even address it. Failure
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to raise an issue below results in waiver of any objections related to that issue.
Ashcroft, 855 P.2d at 268-69.
Second, Harmon misinterprets Garrity. His position is that "Garrity [sic]
similar in nature to Miranda, protects public employees from discharge for
invoking the Fifth Amendment privilege." Harmon's Brf., p. 38. He claims that
his refusal to answer Chief Mathieu and his statement prior to the Second
Predetermination hearing that his answers were "in the letter" (R. 2886), "was
undisputedly Garrity.'" See Harmon's Brf., p. 21. This is incorrect. Garrity
stands for the proposition that when a public employee is questioned during an
investigation by the entity, nothing in the interview can later be used against the
employee in a criminal proceeding. See Garrity, 385 U.S. at 496. Accordingly,
this Court has described Garrity as follows:
A Garrity warning allows a police officer's superiors to order an
officer to provide information during an investigation, and requires
the officer to comply, but provides that any information elicited by
such order cannot be used against the officer in a subsequent criminal
prosecution.
Kelly v. Salt Lake City Civil Serv. Comm'n, 2000 UT App 235, f 32 n.9, 8 P.3d
1048 (citing Garrity). There is no evidence that anything Harmon said was used
in a criminal prosecution and therefore no reason for Garrity to be an issue.
Indeed, the reason Garrity warnings are given during investigations of public
employees relating to their employment is to inform them that things they say
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cannot be used against them in a criminal investigation, but that they must answer
questions and must answer truthfully, and if they do not they can be disciplined.
There also no evidence Harmon refused to answer. He simply said that his
response was "in the letter" and did not try to correct any misunderstandings.
Chief Mathieu and the three Commissioners were correct to view this as an intent
to deceive. Accordingly, Harmon's Garrity argument should be disregarded.
C.

HARMON DID NOT MARSHAL THE EVIDENCE AS TO
MITIGATING FACTORS, AND HAS NOT SHOWN THE
COMMISSION ERRED IN AFFIRMING HIS TERMINATION.
The ultimate task assigned to the Commission on remand was to determine

whether Chief Matthieu's disciplinary decision of termination was appropriate as
to degree of severity. To challenge this, Harmon must first marshal evidence as to
mitigating factors,2 and then show how the termination decision was excessive and
an abuse. Since he has failed to do this, the Remand Order should be affirmed.
First, Harmon has not marshaled the evidence in favor of a termination
decision, or he at least has failed to designate his arguments as such. Instead, he
refers back to the First Decision by the Commission, and discusses in his Facts
section why that Decision was proper. He also has included in his Facts several

2

Harmon I determined there is no inconsistency in the decision, i.e., no one
similarly situated to Harmon who was treated less severely. See Harmon /, 2005
UT App 274,116, 116 P.3d 973. In addition, as shown above, the Remand Order
did consider all seven incidents plus the dishonesty issue.
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arguments as to why some determinations are incorrect. For example, discussing
the Zucchini Incident in the Facts, he states "[h]owever, as noted above, the
incident was admittedly isolated and not a pattern of sexual harassment. It could
not be construed as a Title VII violation— no one timely reported feeling harassed
by either comments." Harmon Brf., p. 20 (emphasis in original).
Second, even if what Harmon has done in his brief could be considered as
marshaling the evidence (which the City disputes), he fails to show why it was
improper for the Commission to affirm the discipline of termination as far as
severity is concerned. The "discipline imposed for employee misconduct is within
the sound discretion of the Chief," with the question and standard for the Chiefs
disciplinary decision being whether the Chief abused his/her discretion. Lucas,
949 P.2d at 761; accord, Kelly, 2000 UT App 235, f 22, 8 P.3d 1048. The Chief
"exceeds the scope of his discretion if the punishment imposed is in excess of 'the
range of sanctions permitted by statute or regulation, or if, in light of all the
circumstances, the punishment is disproportionate to the offense." Lucas,
949 P.2d at 761. "If a penalty is so harsh as to constitute an abuse, rather than an
exercise of discretion, it cannot be allowed to stand." Id. (citation omitted). The
appellate court reviews "the sanction in light of all the circumstances underlying
the termination." Kelly, 2000 UT App 235, f 24, 8 P.3d 1048.
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Gathering the various arguments spread throughout Harmon's brief, it
appears that he asserts that the following mitigate against termination: (1) he had a
property interest in his job (Harmon's Brf., p. 38); (2) the "seven isolated and
remote incidents" were "non-offensive idosyncratic conduct" (id.)\ (3) he had a
21-year career with OFD (id.); (4) Garrity precludes terminating a public
employee for refusing to answer during an investigation {id., pp. 39-40); (5) he
was denied due process when on remand the Commission did not fully hear the
dishonesty issue {id., pp. 40-41); (6) "Steve Thompson, who wrote [Harmon's]
evaluations disliked Harmon and that disdain reflected in the evaluations" {id.,
p. 43); (7) Harmon actually tried to be honest (id., pp. 43, 46); (8) the Weedkiller
Incident was intended as a joke and as a "camaraderie building experience" (id.,
p. 44); (9) the incidents did not "impede Harmon's ability to fight fires," or
"adversely affect or undermine public confidence," or undermine the station's
morale (id., p. 46); (10) Harmon's men loved him (id., p. 46); (11) other
individuals were involved in some of the incidents and were not terminated (id.,
pp. 46-47); (12) some of the incidents happened years earlier and were not timely
reported (id., p. 47) (citing Title VII law); (13) the Zucchini Incident was not
"sexual harassment" under law; (14) horseplay was widespread (id., p. 48); and
(15) he is entitled to the benefit of the doubt (id.). These arguments not only fail,

33

they actually support appellee's position that the termination was not an overly
severe discipline.
First, most of these factors have no relevance to mitigation. For example,
the only thing a property interest guarantees is due process and there is no doubt
that Harmon received notice and an opportunity to be heard, as well as the process
required under Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1012. Similarly, Garrity is not at issue for
the reasons discussed above, and "benefit of the doubt" has nothing to do with
specific reasons for mitigation. Further, Harmon had the chance to argue the
dishonesty issue on remand, but declined. Thus, he has waived that issue.
Second, the Court should reject Harmon's bald assertions that he "tried to
be honest," that he displayed "non-offensive idosyncratic conduct," and that the
Weedkiller Incident was a "camaraderie building experience." Denying that
public urination is offensive or claiming that a captain such as Harmon should be
excused for substituting urine for weedkiller in a container because it was intended
as a "camaraderie building experience" is bizarre, and also ignores the duty of
responsibility his position requires. Moreover, "trying" to be honest is not
mitigation; it is a poor excuse for not being honest.
Third, there is no basis for Harmon's reliance on Title VII's 300-day filing
period to support his position that the incidents of his misconduct from earlier
years should be ignored or downplayed. See Harmon's Brf., pp. 47-48 (referring
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to Tenth Circuit law that charge of discrimination must be filed with EEOC within
300 days of alleged violation). Although Title VII has a limitations period for
filing a charge, this is not a Title VII case and the filing period is totally irrelevant
here. Moreover, the fact that Harmon did not report, and even hid, some of the
past incidents enhances the severity of his conduct because it shows deception
over a long period of time, and demonstrates why progressive discipline was not
feasible.
Fourth, whether or not the Zucchini Incident became "legal" sexual
harassment does not mitigate Harmon's conduct. The young woman could have
filed a charge of discrimination against the City, which is the point. An employer
can avoid liability for sexual harassment if it "exercised reasonable care to prevent
and correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior." Burlington Industries,
Inc. v. Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. 2257 (1998); Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 118 S. Ct.
2275 (1998). Harmon's conduct in hiding this incident, his involvement in it as a
supervisor, and his failure to discipline the young woman, all put the City at risk.
Indeed, in Autoliv ASP. Inc., v. Department of Workforce Services, 2001 UT App
198, 29 P.3d 7, this Court held there was just cause for terminating an employee
who exposed his employer to sexual harassment claims, and affirmed denial of
unemployment benefits to two employees who were terminated for sending
sexually explicit e-mails. This Court noted that this "exposes the employer to
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sexual harassment and sex discrimination lawsuits." Autoliv, 2001 UT App. f 26,
29 P.3d 7 (citation omitted). Under Autoliv, it also is irrelevant whether or not the
horseplay was "common in the Department." See id. passim. Inappropriate sexual
conduct should be subject to discipline regardless of whether it is consensual or
"common" because it can create a hostile work environment for everyone exposed
to it.
Fifth, the Court should reject the argument that other individuals were
involved in some of the incidents and were not terminated. No other person was
involved in all of the incidents at issue and also had borderline evaluations and
was deemed deceitful. Moreover, this goes to the consistency element and
Harmon I has already instructed there is no inconsistency in this case because no
one else had ever been involved in incidents like Harmon had been.
This leaves the following as Harmon's mitigating factors: (1) a 21-year
career with OFD; (2) "Steve Thompson, who wrote [Harmon's] evaluations
disliked Harmon and that disdain reflected in the evaluations''^) the incidents did
not "impede Harmon's ability to fight fires," or "adversely affect or undermine
public confidence," or undermine the station's morale; (4) Harmon's men loved
him; and (5) horseplay was widespread. Even combined, these do not mitigate
Chief Mathieu's decision, nor do they suggest that it would be disproportionate to
the offense or an abuse of discretion. Indeed, although Harmon's men may have
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loved him, his March 2, 2000 evaluation notes that even though Harmon's crew
liked him, it did not trust him because he had problems fulfilling his duties.
R. 465.
In sum, Harmon has failed to meet his burden to show termination was too
severe under the circumstances.
D.

HARMON'S TERMINATION WAS APPROPRIATE.
Based on relevant standards, the Remand Order appropriately affirmed

Harmon's termination. Harmon was an OFD captain and supervisor during at
least the Weedkiller, Zucchini, Drafting Pit, MDA, and Horseplay Incidents. As a
captain, he is held to a higher duty and is expected to set the example for
subordinates and those whom he supervises. He even admitted at the first
predetermination hearing that as a supervisor, he was responsible for "workplace
conduct of introductory firefighters" and that he set the example for "what is
acceptable and what is not acceptable" for his subordinates. R. 327. Similarly, at
the Commission Hearing, Harmon agreed: (1) "with the axiom a leader sets up,
leads by example"; (2) "that a leader is assigned and takes responsibility, takes
responsibility for his actions and is always ready to be held accountable"; and
(3) "the leader makes [] decisions based on his judgment and, therefore, is also
held accountable if something goes wrong." R. 2821-22. He also agreed at the
Commission Hearing that "a captain is to be an example to his crew," (R. 1257),
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and that it was his "duty as a captain to train [a new] employee to know what is
appropriate and not appropriate in the Ogden City Fire Department" (R. 1258). In
light of these admitted standards, Harmon's actions clearly set a poor example for
other employees and for those employees he supervised.
Moreover, aside from the six specific incidents of misconduct and the
Remand Order's determination that Harmon showed an "intent to deceive," his
conduct was not exemplary for an employee of 21 years. His evaluations had been
inconsistent and frequently poor for over ten years. His annual employee
evaluations from February 17, 1991 through March 2000 reflect that he typically
received mid-range marks, and was frequently cautioned and received low marks
for failing to stay on-task and due to poor personal relations with co-workers. See
R. 375-471 (evaluations); R. 1773-2022 (Comm. Hrg. Trans.). From about 1995
through 2000, his performance deteriorated further. On December 13, 1995, he
received a Second Written Warning cautioning him about his poor work
performance, inefficient work habits, failure to discipline subordinates, conflicts
with peer supervisors, and failure to stay on-task, including failing to provide
timely evaluations. R. 278, 388.
Similarly, his 1996 annual evaluation notes he has "trouble working with
others on a mutual respect basis," and he received "marginal" scores in leadership,
planning/organization, meeting schedules/ utilizing resources, personnel
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management/interpersonal skills, and flexibility/adaptability/initiative. R. 403-06.
His March 3, 1997 annual evaluation expressed concerns with his problems in
"sizing up" and prioritizing tasks, and the evaluator was concerned about his
reliability. R. 439. In his March 3, 1998, annual evaluation, Harmon again
received "marginal" in the categories of planning/organization, and meeting
schedules/utilizing resources. See R. 446-54. On April 19, 1998, he was
counseled about leaving his assigned location at a fire without informing the
Incident Commander. R. 444; R. 2014. In his 2000 evaluation, he scored
"marginal" in the categories of productivity/efficiency and meeting schedules/
utilizing resources (R. 466-67), and it is noted that although he has good
leadership traits and is liked by his crew, the crew did not trust him because he had
problems fulfilling his duties. R. 465.
In addition to these poor evaluations, in the eighteen months prior to his
termination, Harmon failed to attend four required meetings. On June 10, 1999, he
did not attend a workgroup leaders meeting, where he was a Team Leader, because
he claims he "spaced it." R. 458. On August 17, 1999, he failed to attend a CPR
class for reservists that he scheduled and where he was an instructor. R. 289. On
September 18, 1999, Harmon did not show up for Reserve Corps meeting that he
set up as the Team Leader. R. 289. On November 11, 1999, he received a Notice
of Caution for missing the 1999 meetings, and was removed as Team Leader.
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R. 289. As a final blow, on November 14, 2000, during the investigation that
culminated in his termination, Harmon failed to show up for a class he was
supposed to teach, although it had been scheduled for eight months and was
posted on OFD yearly and monthly calendars. R. 473-74.
These facts demonstrate that the decision to terminate Harmon was not
irrational or unreasonable. Chief Mathieu testified at the Commission Hearing
that, in making the disciplinary decision, he considered all of the offenses
collectively: "In consideration, I considered all of the offenses collectively. I
didn't consider them individually." R. 1755. He further testified that he had never
before had a situation arise where an employee was "involved in an incident that
in any way related to an employee urinating on somebody, in something, around a
place that was inappropriate," let alone three such incidents, so that there was no
one else to whom to compare Harmon's behavior. R. 2396-97. Chief Mathieu
also testified that in making his disciplinary decision, he took into account
Harmon's past annual performance evaluations and his past disciplinary history.
R. 1972. He also reviewed areas in evaluations where Harmon was marked as
"marginal," including with regard to staying on-task, time management, and
blaming others when criticized. See R. 1973-2022.
Chief Mathieu also told Commissioners that he took into account what he
believed to be Harmon's dishonesty at the second predetermination hearing in
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denying the Weedkiller Incident, when Chief Mathieu already had evidence that
the incident had occurred. R. 2373-75. He further noted that he did not terminate
Harmon solely on the basis of his finding that Harmon had lied, but also on his
belief Harmon had "displayed an intent to be dishonest." R. 2607-08; 2373-75.
According to Chief Mathieu's testimony at the Commission Hearing, he
made the decision to terminate Harmon because he believed it was in the best
interest of the City and the OFD (R. 2402), and that he felt that "there was much
more than what was needed to terminate Dan Harmon." R. 2607-08. In this
situation, Harmon's actions collectively establish that termination was the only
appropriate discipline.
Finally, the mitigating circumstances cited in Harmon I have no application
here. Harmon did not have an "exemplary service record" and the evidence of
misconduct is not "tenuous." Moreover, the violations are "directly related to the
[Harmon's] official duties and significantly impedes his . . . ability to carry out
those duties," since he was a captain and his actions seriously impacted the regard
in which he would be held by co-workers and subordinates. The offenses also
were "of a type that adversely affect[] the public confidence in the department,"
and were such that they "undermine[d] the morale and effectiveness of the
department." The MDA Incident alone undermines public confidence in that it
leads the public to wonder what kinds of conduct are going on in public buildings,
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and whether public employees will be available and ready to perform their duties
when those duties arise. This is particularly true for firefighters. Further, the
morale and effectiveness of the department are affected by an out-of-control
captain who himself flaunts policies and procedures. Finally, it is clear that the
offenses were "committed willfully or knowingly," and were not simply negligent
or inadvertent.
In sum, the Remand Order properly affirmed Chief Mathieu's decision to
terminate Harmon, and that decision was not unreasonable or irrational.
Harmon's conduct was sexually-charged, inappropriate, deceptive, and totally
inappropriate for someone in his position. It was embarrassing to OFD, and
placed OFD in a poor light. Nor did Harmon have an otherwise exemplary record
and, in fact, he had received poor evaluations and been subject to discipline for
over ten years prior to his termination. This is not a situation where Chief Mathieu
acted impulsively or without thought. He obviously balanced the situation, and
determined it was not in the best interests of OFD to continue to employ Harmon.
E.

THE COURT SHOULD DECLINE TO ADDRESS THE § 1983 ISSUE.
Harmon asks this Court to find that the Commission has violated Harmon's

rights under 42 U.S.C. f 1983. He also asks that the Court issue what can only be
an advisory opinion as to the scope of § 1983 claims against governmental
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bodies/persons that have reviewed a disciplinary decision made pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. § 10-3-1012. These requests should be rejected.
This Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over any § 1983 claims that are
raised in Harmon's brief because Utah appellate courts do not have original
jurisdiction over civil claims such as § 1983 claims. Compare Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-2-2 with § 78-2a-3 with § 78-3-4. Moreover, it is wholly inappropriate for
Harmon to assert for the first time to this Court that he has an actionable claim
against the Commission for violating his § 1983 rights. No such claims were
asserted, raised or even addressed below. As an appellate court, this Court cannot
address substantive claims that are asserted for the first time before this Court.
For example, in Simmons v. Farmers Ins. Group, 877 P.2d 1255 (Utah Ct. App.
1994), this Court refused to address a claim by an insured against an insurance
company for breach of duty of good faith and fair dealing, where the insured was
raising the claim for the first time on appeal. Id., at 1259 (citing as support
numerous Utah cases).
Even if there was a § 1983 claim to review, which there is not, Harmon's
brief is totally deficient in any legal analysis or authority to support the request.
Utah appellate court will refuse to address an issue in a brief where the "brief
wholly lacks legal analysis and authority to support... [the] argument."
Wareham, 772 P.2d at 966; see also, e.g., McKay v. Hardy, 973 P.2d 941, 948 n.9
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(Utah 1998) (citing cases where court refused to consider arguments where
briefing inadequate).
F.

HARMON'S OTHER ARGUMENTS ARE WITHOUT MERIT.
Even if the Court were to consider Harmon's new claims and arguments on

the merits, all of them should be rejected.
First, he contends that his "stigma concerns" were "unconstitutionally left
unresolved by the Commission." Harmon's Brf., p. 34. In this context, he
contends the Remand Order caused him to be stigmatized and have his reputation
diminished, and makes it more difficult for him to obtain future employment. See
id., pp. 35-37 (citing Walker v. United States, 744 F.2d 67 (10th Cir. 1984) and
Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976)). This argument makes no sense. The cases
cited by Harmon deal with liberty interest claims, where plaintiffs assert that, due
to a denial of due process (i.e., a hearing) during a termination, they have not had
the opportunity to "clear" their names. Harmon, however, undisputedly received
all of the process to which he was entitled under constitutional requirements and
under Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1012. He was notified of the charges, had predetermination hearings where he could give any explanations he chose to make,
and was then given a full hearing including the opportunity to call witnesses of his
own and cross-examine witnesses called by the City. He also was allowed to
submit a brief on remand, and would have had oral argument if he had agreed to
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appear. This is all the law requires, and his liberty interest argument is outside the
scope of this appeal.
Second, Harmon's property interest claim is similarly flawed. See
Harmon's Brf., pp. 37-38 (citing Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1971)).
The City does not deny that Harmon had a property interest in his employment.
However, all that a property interest implies is that an individual cannot be
terminated without cause and that due process is required during the disciplinary
process. As discussed above, Harmon received all the due process to which he
was entitled, and his termination was fully justified under the standards articulated
by this Court.
Third, Harmon appears to contend that he was not given a full and fair
hearing with all that a fair hearing implies. See Harmon's Brf., pp. 40-41 (citing
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) and Roach v. National Trans Safety
£d.,804F.2d 1147 (10th Cir. 1986)). This is false. Harmon's hearing prior to the
Commission's First Decision was full and fair, including the fact that Harmon was
represented by counsel, had the right to call witnesses on his own behalf, crossexamine the City's witnesses, and offer evidence and exhibits on his behalf.
Further, his arguments that Garrity was not considered and that the "honesty"
issue was not "fully determined" are without merit. The Remand Order discusses
the honesty issue. Moreover, as discussed above, Harmon stipulated that the
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record on remand would be the same as that before the Harmon I Court. Harmon
also had the opportunity to submit a brief arguing the issues that he felt should be
considered on remand. Despite the fact that he failed to even file that brief in a
timely manner or in proper form, it was accepted by the Commission. He also
could have argued anything he chose in that brief but elected to omit any Garrity
argument. In addition, he declined to appear for oral argument. In short, Harmon
was allowed to do whatever he wished on remand even to the detriment of the City
which, because of Harmon, was not allowed oral argument. Harmon accordingly
was given all process of which he chose to avail himself.
VII. CONCLUSION
The Ogden City Fire Department asks this Court to affirm the Remand
Decision of the Ogden Civil Service Commission, which in turn affirmed Fire
Chief Mike Mathieu's decision to terminate OFD Captain Dan Harmon.
DATED this /£?Afay of January, 2007.
SNOW,.CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

Stanley J. Preston
Cafnille N. Johnson
Judith D. Wolferts
Attorneys for Ogden City and Ogden City
Fire Department
N:\13607\570\second appeal\briefs\fnl app brf 1-1 l-07.wpd
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STATE O F U T A H

DANIEL HARMON,
Petitioner,
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Appeal No._
Priority No. (14)

vs.

OGDEN CITY CIVIL SERVICE
COMMISSION, OGDEN CITY
CORPORATION, OGDEN CITY
FIRE DEPARTMENT AND FIRE
CHIEF MIKE MATHIEU,
Respondents.
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CHAPTER 1
GENERAL
ARTICLE 1.

General Adoption. The following Rules and Regulations shall supersede and
cancel all other Rules and Regulations previously issued and are subject to the
provisions of the Ogden Administrative Code and City Personnel Rules and
Regulations now and as hereafter amended. All portions of general and special
orders and operational and procedure manuals that may be issued relative to the
discipline and/or duties and powers of members shall be recognized as a portion
of these Rules and Regulations and shall have equal force and effect.

ARTICLE 2.

Oath of Office. All members are expected to conform to the criteria stated in
the following oath of office:
I do solemnly swear that I will support the Constitution of the United States of
America and that of the State of Utah; that I will obey the Laws and Ordinances
of the City of Ogden, familiarize myself with and be obedient to the Rules and
Regulations and orders of the Ogden City Fire Department, and faithfully serve
the City of Ogden in the discharge of my duties as a firefighter to the best of my
knowledge and ability.

ARTICLE 3.

Section 3.01.

A copy of these Rules and Regulations will be available to
allfirefightersand it shall be his/her duty to be familiar
with the contents hereof and to conduct themselves
accordingly. Any violation of these Rules and
Regulations by any member of the Department may be
grounds for disciplinary action.

Section 3,02,

These Rules and Regulations are property of the City of
Ogden and are provided for the expres^fe® use of the
members of the Ogden City Fire Department

Section 3.03,

These Rules and Regulations cannot, nor are they
expected to, provide a solution to every question or
problem which may arise in an organization designed and
established to render emergency service. It is expected,
however, that they will be sufficiently comprehensive to
cover, either in a specific or general way, the privileges,
obligations and duties of members of the Ogden City Fire
Department.

R-0497

Section 3.04,

These Rules are not designed or intended to limit any
member in the exercise of judgement or initiative in
taking action a reasonable person would take in
extraordinary situations which arise in the fire service.
By necessity, these decisions must be left to the loyalty,
integrity, and discretion of members. To the degree
which individual members demonstrate possession of these
qualities in the conscientious discharge of their duty, and
to that degree alonewill the Department measure up to the
high standard required and expected of the fire service.

Section 3.05.

These Rules and Regulations amended June 18, 1997, and
continually as required.

REVIEWED AND APPROVED:

Michael L. Mathieu, Fire Chief
Ogden City Fire Department

n.-ii«hF

-5-

R-0497
CHAPTER 2
DEFTNITIONS

ACTING CHBEF-A person's temporary appointment to the position of I 'hief Otticxr.
ACTING OFF1CER-A member holding a temporary rank or position or performing services
temporarily.
ALARM \ in ilifkMtion to respond to tin emergency.
APPARATUS-Any motorized equipment carryingfirefightingtools.
APPARATUS OPERATOR-A member who has been trained to drive a specific piece of apparatus
and has full responsibility for that apparatus while driving or operating it.
BATTALION CHBEF-An individual in charge of all emergency personnel < in hi s Jul 1 1hr lop
field commander on a day to day basis.
CHANNELS (THROUGH)-The transmission of orders and communications through the immediate
officers in ascending or descending order of rank.
COMMANDING OFFICER-The officer or acting officer who is the member's immediate
supervisor in the chain of command.
COMPANY A crew of members commanded by a captain assigned to a station.
COMPANY OFFTCER-Officer or member in command of a fire company.
COMMUNICATIONS MANAGER - Manager overfire/policedispatch.
DEPUTY CHBEF-Thr (1m ! Operational t If ficer(s) of the Department and head(s) of the Operations
Division.
DIVISION CHIEF-Directs division or specific divisional function of the Fire Department.
ELECTRONICS CHIEF-Performs repair and installation of all electronics and communications
equipment as well as maintenance of all traffic semaphores.
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FIRE CHIEF-The Chief Administrative Officer of the Fire Department.
FIRE MARSHAL--The officer in charge, on a daily basis, of the Department's fire prevention and
investigation programs.
FIRE DISTRICT AREA-Geographical areas of the City designated for purposes of fire prevention
management and statistical analysis.
FIRST ALARM, NON-STRUCTURE--A one (1) company response to an alarm.
FIRST ALARM, STRUCTURE-A normal complement of equipment responding to a first alarm
fire, as distinguished from a first alarm non-structure.
FIRST DUE—The company that is normally to arrive first on an alarm.
FBRST-IN-DISTRICT--The area in which a company is normally the first to arrive in response to an
alarm.
GENERAL ORDER-Any order of permanent character which requires the attention of all
Department personnel. These are filed in the Fire Department and Standard Operating Procedures
Manuals.
HALF SHIFT-Twelve (12) hours. For purposes pertaining to these Rules and Regulations.
HEADQUARTERS-The office of the Fire Chief, i.e., the administrative center of the Department.
HYDRANT DISTRICT—An area within which a company tests hydrants, corresponding to its Firstin-District.
IMMEDIATE FAMBLY-The spouse, parents, children, brothers, sisters, mother-in-law or father-inlaw of the employee.
INCIDENT COMMAND SYSTEM-Emergency management plan for emergency operations.
INCIDENT COMMANDER-The member who is in charge and has the responsibilities of an
emergency incident in which the Fire Department is involved. (See S.O.P. SOP-191.A.FD)
MEMBER-Any employee duly and regularly appointed in the Fire Department to perform duties in
the City of Ogden, under whatever designation they may be described in an salary or ordinance
providing compensation for the Fire Department. The term "member" shall include officers.

IIAIHI7
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ON-DUTY--A condition of employment wherein a member is actively engaged in d ium Hon ol ill i
Department for which he/she is being financially compensated.
PLATOON-The entire firefighting personnel on-duty during a prescribed period.
QUARTERS-Is construed to mean any engme house, Department building, office, storeroom,
workroom, station, shop or place wherein members are assigned and employed during their working
hours.
REGULAR CHANNELS--Means forwarded by intermediate officers in ascending order of rank or
grade, which order shall be reversed when forwarded in descending order of rank or grade.
RESERVE FIREFIGHTER-An unpaid employee of the Fire Department.
SENIOR OFFICER-The one who has served longer in the same office or position than another, or a
member so designated by the Fire Chief.
SHIFT-One shift shall mean a period of twenty-four consecutive hours.
SHIFT COMMANDER-The Battalion Chief appointed by the Chief to manage the shift.
STATION MANAGER-A fire officer, usually the most senior, assigned to manage routine matters
of fire station order, convenience, and necessity.
SUBORDINATE-A member who stands in order of rank below another.
TOUR-Four sli 11 l.s ml Lwenty-four hours, or any fraction of a shift spent on-duty, based on a 56 hour
work cycle.
UNIFORM FIRE CODE--A fire code adopted by the City to supplement any and all laws of the
State to safeguard life, health, property, and public welfare to a reasonable degree from the hazards of
fire and explosion.
UNIT—Means one company, one piece of apparatus, ui a single thing.
VERBAL ALARM-Notification by citizens, reporting directly to a company orally, that an
emergency exists in or out of quarters. (Also called "walk-in" alarm.)
WORK S H i n - F o r all Fire Department positions, i xcepl lhose designated by the Fire Chief, the
work shift shall be twenty-four (24) hours.
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GENERAL RULES FOR ALL MEMBERS
SECTION 1.

Under the direction of the Chief, members detailed to lead the various divisions
of the Department shall have charge of the supervisory duties of their respective
areas and shall be responsible for the maintenance of discipline and authority.

SECTION 2.

All uniformed members of the Department shall be regarded as part of the
working force and may be required to perform such duties as the circumstances
of the service demand.

SECTION 3.

The violation of any of the provisions of the Rules and Regulations or orders of
the Department, or the neglected duties prescribed, shall be the subject of
disciplinary action.

SECTION 4.

Suggestions for improvement of the Department or the well-being of the
membership will, when presented in writing through channels, be welcomed and
carefully considered.

SECTION 5.

Members are subject to recall details and extra duty required to cope with
emergencies or to effectively represent the Department in civic and other public
functions.

SECTION 6.

When two or more members below the rank of Captain find themselves in a
position which requires command action, the member with the most time in the
highest grade will assume command until relieved by a superior officer.

SECTION 7.

When a member receives an order which is in conflict with a previous order,
he/she shall so inform the officer who issued the conflicting order and be
governed by his/her instructions as clarified.

SECTION 8.

Any member having cause to believe that he/she has been unjustly or unfairly
treated should refer to the City grievance procedure which is in this City's
personnel handbook.

SECTION 9.

Members shall choose vacations in the order of their seniority; such seniority tc
date from the last date of appointment to the Department, in accordance with
the instruction and provisions prescribed by the Chief.

UOU09
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SECTION 10.

Acting positions shall be filled according to criterion as written by the Chief.

SUCTION 11.

Probationary employees from the Captain's level down through the position of
probationary firefighters shall be evaluated every three and six months
throughout their probationary period. All performance reports will be initiated
prior to their due date by the Chief and sent to the supervisor responsible for the
evaluation of probationary personnel under their supervision.

SECTION 12.

In the transaction of Department busmess, members shall, unless uiheiwise
ordered, operate through their immediate superior officers.

SECTION 13.

All members of the Department, regardless of assignment, are subject to the
rules, regulations, and orders concerning the uniformed force, particularly such
rules and regulations as apply to conduct, discipline, and violation of laws.

SECTION 14.

All personnel of the Department shall have installed and shall maintain a
telephone in their residence at all times, and they shall verbally notify their
superior officer within twenty-four hours of any change of address or telephone
number. Written notice shall be forwarded without delay to the Administrative
Secretary.

SECTION 15.

In matters of conduct, members shall be governed by the ordinary and
reasonable rules of behavior observed by law-abiding and self-respecting
citizens and shall commit no act tending to bring reproach or discredit upon the
City, the Department, or its members.

SECTION 16.

No member shall conduct himself/herself in a manner, or be a party to, any act
which would tend to impair the good order and discipline of the Department.

SECTION I

No member shall be employed in, or connected with, any business or
occupation which will impair Departmental proficiency or bring adverse
criticism on the Department.

SECTION 18.

No information relative to the business affairs or policies of the Department
shall be furnished to any person or persons not connected therewith, except as
authorized by the Chief, the Mayor, the City Council, or their authorized
representatives.

R-0497
Revised: 6/24/1997
SECTION 19.

No member shall, on- or off-duty, use the badge, uniform, or prestige of the
Department for the purpose of personal gain.

SECTION 20.

No member shall receive or accept a reward, fee, or gift from any person for
the performance of duty, except with the permission of the Chief.

SECTION 21.

No member shall contact any other Department of the City government or
member thereof on any matter affecting the Department or any employee,
except through regular channels, or in those cases where routine or emergency
Department business requires. This would not prohibit Fire Department
personnel from appearing before the City Council in regard to personal
business.

SECTION 22.

No member shall directly or indirectly solicit the influence or intercession of
any person or persons outside of the Department to effect their transfer or
promotion.

SECTION 23.

No member shall solicit or accept the personal or financial aid of any
subordinate to promote his private interests or those of any superior officer.

SECTION 24.

No member, while on-duty, shall attempt to influence the vote of any person for
or against any candidate for City public office.

SECTION 25.

No solicitations, speeches, or distribution of campaign literature for or against
any candidate for public office shall be permitted on Department property.

SECTION 26.

Members shall avoid heated or emotional arguments while on-duty.

SECTION 27.

No member shall report for or be on-duty under the influence of any alcoholic
beverage, illegal drug, or compound.

SECTION 28.

No member shall bring, or cause to be brought, into quarters any alcoholic
beverage, illegal drug, or compound.

SECTION 29.

No member shall have in his possession, or partake of, any alcoholic beverage,
illegal drug, or compound while on-duty, in uniform, or while in any Fire
Department vehicle.

<- ^ , : 1 1

.1!

R-0497
Revised: 11/1to1")»»K

SECTION 30. No member shall engage in any malicious gossip, report, or activity which would tend to
disrupt Department morale or bring discredit to the Department or any member thereof.
SECTION 31. No member shall use obscene, uncivil, or loud and boisterous language at fires, in
quarters, or while engaged in activities in which the Department is represented.
Engagement in altercations under any circumstances shall be avoided. If any physical
altercation occurs, it shall be reported, in writing, to the Fire Chief.
SECTION 32. The falsification of records, the making of misleading entries or statements with intent to
deceive, or the willful mutilation of any useful Department record, book, paper, or
document shall be cause for disciplinary action.
SECTION 33. Members shall not loan, sell, give away, or appropriate for their own use, any public
property, nor shall they pilfer or be guilty of theft at fires or elsewhere.
SECTION 34. Members shall not gamble in quarters, on details, or while on-duty.
SECTION 35. Personnel, who because of illness, cannot report to work, must notify the Battalion Chief
on his/her platoon, or the on-duty Battalion Chief if unable to contact his/her own

Battalion Chief by 0700 hours of that day. The firefighter must then contact his/her
station officer as to the situation and advise that they have already contacted the
Battalion Chief. Personnel reporting late for work shall submit a written report to the
shift Battalion Chief.
SECTION 36. Unsatisfactory performance shall be sufficient cause for disciplinary action.
SECTION 37. No member shall willfully disobey any lawful order issued by a superior officer.
SECTION 38. No member shall speak disrespectfully of, or to, any superior officer; officers' titles shall
be utilized in the transaction of official business.
SECTION 39. All injuries, regardless of how minor seemingly trivial, shall be reported to the
individual's superior and entered in the journal at the station to which the person is
assigned, as well as, thewTitteareport of injury. For further procedures, refer to
Department Regulatio^^0197^) and Ogden City Fitness for Duty policy.
SECTION 40. All members, when referring to an officer in an official pei son capacity , shall address
such officer by title, such as "Chief, "Captain", etc.

R-0497
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SECTI0N41.

Captains shall assign available members to the cleaning and maintenance of
quarters and apparatus, equalizing the duties as nearly as possible.

SECTION 42.

When two or more company commanders are located in the same quarters, they
shall confer with each other in regard to repairs, supplies, and upkeep of
quarters and shall work cooperatively with each other.

SECTION 43.

All members shall, before leaving to go off-duty, acquaint their successors with
every significant detail of their tour of duty and give them all such information
as may be necessary for the efficient operation of the Department

SECTION 44.

Company commanders on-duty shall not permit any member of their company
to go off-duty until properly relieved by an on-coming member or until the
anticipated number of members of the on-coming shift has arrived.

SECTION 45.

Ranking members shall be relieved by members of equal rank, or, if a member
of equal rank will not be present at change of shift, by the member who is
assigned to perform those duties on that date.

SECTION 46.

The hour of shift change shall be 0800 daily. All members shall be "response
ready" at 0800. "Response ready" is when the member's assigned
equipment is at/on the apparatus they are assigned to and the member and
their equipment are ready to respond. At change of shift, captains shall take
company roll call, read orders and communications received on opposite shift,
distribute official communications to members, and deliver oral information or
instruction deemed necessary.

SECTION 47.

All members shall familiarize themselves with the contents of all official
communications.

SECTION 48.

Captains shall post on the bulletin board all communications as he/she receives
them. After a 30-day period, the communications shall be removed from the
bulletin board and placed appropriately.

SECTION 49.

In the event of earthquake shocks jeopardizing the stability of quarters, officers
shall cause apparatus to be removed to a safe place as near to quarters as
possible.

SECTION 50.

No member shall change or alter the arrangement of firefighting equipment on
apparatus, or elsewhere, without permission of the senior station officer.
Further, no Department building fixture, or appliance, shall be permanently
changed, altered, or rearranged by any member without approval of the station
-i!«
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-13SECTI0N51.

No member shall allow public loitering in quarters. Under ordinary conditions,
this Section is not intended to prohibit reasonable visitation by members of
families of firefighters working in the station or public employees.

SECTION 52.

Visitation with members of the Fire Department shall occur between the hours
of 12 noon -1:00 p.m. and 5:00 p.m. - 10:00 p.m. Monday through Friday.
Exception to this may be allowed if prior approval is received by the Immediate
Supervisor, but will not exceed 10:00 p.m. on any evening. For weekends or
holidays, visitation hours will be set by Station Officers, but will not interfere
with work duties or exceed 10:00 p.m. at any time.

SECTION 53.

Any member on-duty suffering from fatigue caused by extraordinary
Departmental service or circumstances may, with the express permission of the
shift commander, retire at any time when, in the opinion of the company
commander, condition of the member and requirements of the service justify it.

SliCIION SI

Members may retire after 2000 while on-duty and shall arise in I I iter than
0700, except as provided in Section 52 of this Article.

SECTION 55.

Members occupying beds in quarters at the proper time shall not be
unnecessarily disturbed.

SECTION 56.

Bed linen shall be changed every eighth shift fo keep l>eds in i nwil <md windy y
condition.

SECTION 57.

All members shall keep uniforms, wearing apparel, and other personal
belongings, when not in use, in a locker or closet provided for this purpose.
Such locker or closet is to be kept clean and neat at all times and the doors kept
closed.

SECTION 58.

Visitors or strangers who enter quarters shall be immediately and respectfully
approached and their business ascertained. When the nature of the business is
such that it cannot be accommodated, the company commander shall be called.

SECTION 59.

No Department equipment shall be used for other than Department purposes
without permission of the on-duty station officer in charge.

ShCnON 60.

Privately-owned motor vehicles will not be permitted to park in front-line
apparatus bays or on station ramps.

SECTION 61.

Mechanical work on privately-owned vehicles is permitted only when approved
by the station officer in charge.

-14SECTION 62.
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All materials around quarters, which are of no value to companies, shall be sent
to the Battalion Chief at headquarters for disposal through proper City channels.

SECTION 63.

Members will aggressively and productively participate in the on-duty physical
fitness program on a daily schedule determined by the station officer.

SECTION 64.

All members shall be responsible for security of station entry ways in a manner
to assure that no person can gain access to the premises without the knowledge
of some member of the company. Doors to quarters, as far as practical, must be
closed and locked when company is absent from quarters.

SECTION 65.

The commanding officer shall be notified when mechanics or workmen enter
quarters.

SECTION 66.

All members shall familiarize themselves with and be obedient to the laws,
Rules and Regulations, manuals of operations, and orders affecting operation of
the Fire Department.

SECTION 67.

All members shall practice economy in the use of supplies and metered services
and see that waste is avoided.

SECTION 68.

All members shall be courteous and respectful in their dealings with the public
when engaged in official Fire Department activities such as company
inspections, public education activity, and emergencies.

SECTION 69.

When assigned to act in a higher rank, personnel shall accept responsibility for
the performance of the duties of that position.

SECTION 70.

All members shall keep their persons, uniforms, beds, and lockers in a neat and
clean condition. Persistence in uncleanliness or offensive habits will be grounds
for disciplinary action.

SECTION 71.

All members shall notify their immediate superior officer of all matters coming
to their attention affecting the interest and welfare of the Department.

SECTION 72.

All members shall possess a valid Utah Driver's License before operating any
Fire Department vehicle.

SECTION 73.

Members from different shifts may trade time by submitting written application
to the officer in charge at least 24 hours in advance. Any trades, regardless of
hours that begin at shift change, requires a written approved trade request.
Exceptions to this are trades for four hours or less at any other time during the
course of individual's shift.
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SECTION 74.

Smoking on any apparatus is prohibited.

SECTION 75.

Smoking in stations is prohibited as per Utah Clean Air Act.

SUCTION /<-

No fire officer may assume command of an iiieiclnit wilhoul ihe foi inal process
of assumption or transfer of command.

SECTION 77.

All members shall be responsible for the maintenance of Fire Department
equipment. A report of equipment failure shall be made to the immediate
supervisor who shall cause an Equipment Trouble Report to be submitted to the
Fleet Maintenance Division,

SECTION 78.

All members must keep required certifications current and in good standing with
local and state authorities. Certifications are specified by the Chief and are
required for employment.

SECTION 79.

All members must maintain a physical profile which tends to indicate overall
good health, strength, flexibility, and absence of obesity as judged by the
mandatory fitness standards of the Department and Department physician.

SECTION 80.

Purely recreational or personal activities and tasks may not be performed in
view of the public while on-duty. Examples: fly casting, archery, golf, boat
polishing, etc.

SECTION 81.

Substation restroom and shower facilities will not be shared by male and female
firefighters. When restroom facilities are in use by one or more persons of the
same sex, the entry doors will clearly be posted as MEN or WOMEN only.

-16-
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CHAPTER 4
PERSONAL APPEARANCE

SECTION 1. Grooming standards are in no way intended to unfairly limit the individual firefighter's
rights of comfort or individuality or to adversely affect the firefighter's personal sense
of self-esteem. The purpose of this grooming regulation is intended to establish a
uniform appearance and professional image. The professional image is important to
gain public confidence from people we serve. Sharp and kept grooming appearances
assist with developing this public confidence.
The following regulation applies to all uniformed members of the Fire Department. It is the
responsibility of all supervisors to see that all personnel under their direct supervision conform to this
regulation.
Hair and Person - General
A.

Cleanliness in all aspects of personal hygiene and a well groomed status is expected.

B.

Male firefighters natural hair must conform with the following parameters:
1.

Length in front must not extend below the eyebrows at any time.

2.

Length in rear must not extend lower than the bottom of the uniform shirt collar
when the firefighter stands erect with head posture in normal position. No hair
restraints will be worn by any male firefighters.

3.

Length on sides must allow visible exposure of the lower xh of the ear when
viewed from the side.

4.

Hair styles, which include unusual coloring, sculpting, layering, etc., are not to
beworn^)
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E.

5.

Hairpieces or wigs must be natural looking, well fitting, and securely attached
to the scalp.

6.

Any hair must not conflict with the normal wearing of protective clothing and
equipment per Department safety regulation regarding protective clothing and .
equipment.

Female firefighters natural hair must conform to the following parameters:
1.

Natural hair length must not extend more than 2" below the bottom of uniform
shirt collar.

2.

Any hair must be restrained so that it does not fall below the eyebrows or cover
the lower lh of the ear.

3.

Hairstyles, which i nclude uni isual coloring, sculpting, layering, etc,, <uc not io
be worn.

4

Hairpieces, wigs, etc., must be natural looking, well fitting, and well secured.

S.

Any hair and hair adjuncts must not conflict with the normal wearing of
protective clothing and equipment.

Jewelry and Makeup.
1

No firefighter will wear jewelry on the head, neck, or hands with the exception
being conservative wristwatches and necessary medical identification. Wedding
rings may be worn at the risk of the wearer, providing the ring does not
negatively impact the wearing of gloves (significant injury may result due to
entrapment of the ring finger).

2.

Makeup (if worn) should be lightly applied, conservative, and appropriate as to
gender.

F.

Facial Hair.
1

Firefighters will be clean shaven throughout the shift.

2.

Beards are not to be worn.
Sideburns must extend no lower than the lower earlobe. Further requirements
may apply per Department regulation regarding protective clothing and
equipment.
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4.

G.

ADVICE!

Mustaches may be worn neat, trim, and well maintained with the following
requirements under natural conditions:
A.

Not to extend down over the lower edge of the upper lip.

B.

Not to extend over one inch (1") out past the corners of the mouth.
Handle bar mustaches, which exceed this l" lateral standard, must be
restrained to meet this standard. Waxing is the only approved restraint.
At no time will the overall lateral length exceed two inches (2H).

C.

Not to extend more than one inch (1") below the corners of the mouth.

Fingernails.
1.

Shall be kept clean and manicured.

2.

Length shall not restrict the performance of duties.

A conservative clean-cut approach to personal grooming will assist a firefighter in
many ways. Credibility and respect from the public will help get the job done with a
minimum of "hassle." Personal image has a lot to do with "leadership" in the fire
service. A crisp "no-nonsense" image is a large part of the Ogden City Fire
Department mission.
NOTE: Special considerations for jewelry, hair, etc., or special symbols associated
with religious conviction may be approval by the Chief upon written application stating
your situation.
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UNIFORMS
The uniform policy does not preclude a firefighter from donning any additional personal equipment
which is utilized for one's safety. All safety equipment is to be donned as per other safety policies and
is the responsibility of each firefighter to exercise good judgement.
The uniform identifies each member as a representative of the Ogden City Fire Department. Therefore,
all uniformed personnel are required to wear and maintain, in a clean/pressed condition, a regulation
Department uniform while on-duty. The regulation uniform required to be maintained by Department
personnel, through the uniform allowance, shall be designated and specified by the Fire Chief.
I.

While wearing a uniform the following general regulations apply:
A.

We will have a daily uniform and a dress uniform. The daily uniform is for general
operations activities. The dress uniform is for pre-arranged public appearances and other
identified special occasions.

B.

While responding on incidents, a uniform will be donned prior to response. Physical
fitness training clothes are not a form of a response uniform. This includes T-shirts,
sweat shorts, sweat pants, and sweat shirts.

C.

On rare occasions, a situation may occur where alternative clothing may be authorized by
a station officer for the purpose of special projects only - example: coveralls for painting
projects. This special use is not allowed for response incidents.

D.

Uniforms shall not be worn while off-duty, except traveling to andfromduty. The
Ogden City Fire Department logo (maltese cross with Ogden City Fire Department
embroidery) is for Fire Department use only. No personal use is allowed.
"Discontinued" uniform apparel is allowed for personal use as long as the wearer
conducts himself/herself as if representing the standards of the Department. Any portion
of the current uniform is not allowed for off-duty use. This includes hats, shirts, and
coats. Uniform vendors will be instructed to not permit the use of the Fire Department
logo on any garment not approved as part of the uniform.

E.

When any portion of the uniform is worn, the complete and proper uniform must be worn
(i.e., approved shirt, pant, and boots or coveralls and boots.)

F.

When conducting company inspections, public education, or as ordered, a complete dress
uniform will be worn (see dress uniform).

G.

At no time may anyone add items or additions to the uniform without prior approval.
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The following section addresses uniform requirements for Administration, Operations, and
Prevention, as well as physical fitness training clothing for all members.
ADMTNTSTRATTON/PRKVENTTON
A.

Regular office attire is required to be worn by Administration personnel. The City-wide
dress down Friday attire is allowed. Dress uniform, dress shirt with tie, daily uniform
and/or suit, is typical attire. Female dress requirements are general office attire.

B.

Dress uniform - Administrative dress uniform for Chief, Deputy Chiefs, Battalion
Chiefs, and Fire Prevention is as follows:
1.

White shirt, flying cross with OFD patch, NFPA certification patch, gold metallic
firefighter badge with rank, gold name tag (first or middle name and last name),
and rank insignia on collar.

2.

Navy dress slacks.

3.

Black dress shoes.

4.

Navy or black belt (conservative buckle no greater than 1-1/2" square).

5.

Must have the following for special occasions:
Class A Coat Eagle #38802 Lighthouse Signatureline TWUSN (includes jacket
and pants) with metallic Fire Department badge, OFD patches, NFPA
certifications, Matching pants #38200 Style T-l.
Navy neck tie. (Chief, Deputy Chief, Battalion Chief, Fire Marshal - required,
optional for others)

C.

Administration secretaries and Dispatchers - Administrative staff and dispatchers
may wear the grey daily uniform shirt identified for Operations. The embroidered
requirements include OFD embroidered insignia, rank and/or title, in identical thread
colors as Operations.

D.

Daily Uniform Shirt. Squad shirt (see Operations for specifications).

E.

Investigations, inspections, special projects.
1.

Topps T-14 navy jumpsuit with insignia same as uniform shirt with exception of
name tag (may sew name patch on jumpsuit); turnouts.

2.

Protective footwear:
*
6-8" high combat style boot. Must provide above ankle support.
i<
Black leather or leather with fabric upper plain shineable toe.
it
Steel toe, protective steel sole shank.
it
High quality, supportive construction.
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Suggested boot styles are:
tV
Ranger Firewalker series
*
Red Wing zippered
*
Wearington Pro series
*
High quality military or logger-style zippered boots
1

Wearguard Three-In-One Parka Style 1308 Red/Charcoal with embroidery of
OFD insignia, EMS certification, and approved rank.

4.

Protective helmet or hard hat will be worn at all times when working in or around
damaged structures.

5.

Faceshields or protective eyewear shall be wain M .ill dimes in oi an mud damaged
structures.

ft,

In addition to investigation uniform requirements, investigators will not enter
buildings without proper safety equipment depending on circumstances.

L

Prevention and Administration personnel may use belt badges for special
identification purposes. This is not allowed to any other divisions.
OPERATIONS

\

Fire Resistive Fabrics
Allfirefightersof the Department are hereby advised that non-fire resistive fabrics i an
bum actively when exposed to high heat or flame impingement. This non-flame
resistance quality can contribute tofirefighterinjury and possible death. The policy of
the Ogden City Fire Department is to advocate and recommend fire resistive uniforms for
our employees regularly exposed to fire andfireproducts when available and practical.
The uniforms of the Fire Department, which are not fire resistive, must be covered by
approved fire resistive, protective clothing whenever a potential for high heat or direct
flame contact is probable within the scope of hostilefirefightingor rescue involvement.
I hv until H in 11 lioice (fire rated versus non-fire rated) is given fo the individual firefighter.

B

Press Uniform
The dress uniform is to be worn for pub In < dm Mum, company inspections, and on other
occasions at the supervisor's discretion,
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Shirts
Light blue Paramount #8002
Short sleeve, fire resistive
Light blue Lion #8022
Long sleeve, fire resistive
Underclothing beneath this shirt, if worn, will be white in color. Underclothing shall
not extend beyond the outer garment sleeve edge.
The following patches/badges will be on these shirts when worn:
1.
OFD patch, left shoulder
2.
NFPA certification patch, right shoulder
3.
Name tag, metallic silver or gold - first or middle name with last name - bla
no substitutes. No plastic.
4.
OFD-approved metallic badge
Department-issued OFD badge
Utah Centennial Model B971 (Ringmasters)
Sesquicentennial Spirit of Pioneering Model B971 (Ringmasters)
Fire/EMS 2002 Olympic Badge (see Administrative Assistant for
ordering)
5.
Insignia
All fire officers and special team members will wear the insignia on their
dress shirt collar:
SWAT OPD
USAR TEAM
HAZMAT TEAM

One SWAT pin on left shirt pocket flap
One gold, metallic star on each lapel
HazMat Team Pin (as approved) on each
lapel
CAPTAIN
Two gold parallel bugles on each lapel
BATTALION CHIEF
Two gold crossed bugles on each lapel
FIRE MARSHAL
Two gold crossed bugles on each lapel
DEPUTY CHIEF
Four gold crossed bugles on each lapel
FIRE CHIEF
Five gold crossed bugles on each lapel
Bugles must be "cut out" style. Insignia is available at uniform
supply distributors.
Pins - Department-issued stork pins - no others.
Tie - Navy blue neck tie (for special occasions)
Belt - Black or navy with conservative buckle (no greater than 1-1/2M
Class A Coat - Lighthouse Signatureline TWUSN (includes jacket and
pants)
A Class A coat/pants is optional for the rank of Captain and below. This
uniform is for special occasions only.
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£anis
Fecheimer 6.5 oz. Nomex pant (navy)
Lion Nomex Pant #602 (navy)
Topps Workhorse Twill, non-fire resistive #3221 (navy)
Topps squad pant, non-fire resistive #20320 (navy)
(Note: The squad pant includes thigh pockets)
Pro Tuff EMS101PW (special fit for female firefighters)
EMT-X 1010 EMT (navy)
Redcap PT10NV (navy)
C.

Daily Uniform
The daily uniform, which will be used year round, will consist of replacing the dress
uniform shirt with the following:
1.

Grey collared squad shirt #5060 Outerbanks Heather Grey (no exceptions) with
the required insignia sewn into the shirt.
a.

OFD embroidered insignia - left chest - thread: red, white, navy.

b.

The following firefighter rank/EMS certification embroidered below OFD
insignia - thread navy, block letters:
Firefighter
EMT or Paramedic
Engineer
EMT or Paramedic
Captain
EMT or Paramedic
Inspector
EMT or Paramedic
Assistant Fire Marshal
EMT or Paramedic
Fire Marshal
EMT or Paramedic
Battalion Chief
EMT or Paramedic
Deputy Chief
EMT or Paramedic
Fire Chief
EMT or Paramedic

The above embroidery specifications apply to coats, jackets, sweat tops, and
fleece tops.
c.

Option for I.D. purposes, first or middle name embroidered on the shirt
tail. Thread navy.

* No other thread colors will be allowed on any embroidered attire. This is to maintain
uniformity. Underclothing beneath this shirt, if worn, shall be white or grey in color.
2.

The metallic OFD badge will only be worn on the dress uniform shirt (no belt
badge clips allowed).
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3.

Footwear

The operations footwear for the dress and daily uniform will be as follows:
iz
6-8" high style protective boot. Must provide above ankle support.
it
Black leather or leather with fabric upper plain shineable toe
it
Steel toe, protective steel sole shank
it
High quality, supportive construction
Suggested boot styles are:
•
Ranger Firewalker series
•
Red Wing zippered
•
Wearington Pro series
•
High quality military or logger style zippered boots
Footwear selection should not hinder a rapid response to an incident. There is no station house
footwear.
4.

Eants

The pant for the daily uniform will be the dress uniform pant.
D.

Stand-by Events
The stand-by event uniform will be the daily uniform.

E.

Jumpsuits
Jumpsuits should be available to operations personnel throughout their working shift.
Jumpsuits should be utilized under the following circumstances to ensure a rapid
response on incidents. When assigned on unit other than ambulance or paramedic
vehicle, bunker pants may serve this same purpose of ensuring a rapid response.
it
it
it
it

During physicalfitnesstraining
During times when one has been sleeping
During drill periods changingfrombunkers (safety equipment) to a response
uniform
During special projects such as station maintenance or small tool repair

NOTE: Jumpsuits are not a substitute for the daily uniform and are only allowed for the
above purposes or other special projects approved by your Captain or Battalion Chief.
Only a white or grey colored undergarment is allowed to be worn under the jumpsuit.
Turnouts or bunkers are a form of personal protective equipment and should not be
considered as a form of uniform. The use of turnouts and bunkers should be used when
conditions of the incident hazard warrant.
^
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Mechanical jumpsuits are for shop use only and are not considered a part of your
uniform.
1.

Insignia for jumpsuits
The following is required on jumpsuit use:
a.
b.
c.
d.

e.

OFD patch, left shoulder
NFPA patch, right shoulder
EMT/Paramedic patch, right chest
Name tag embroidered - above right chest pocket
(1)
Name tag on medium blue cloth backing (USAF color), block
lettering only
(2)
Officer thread color - gold
Firefighter thread color - silver
OFD approved metallic badge
MISCELLANEOUS

Baseball-style cap - Effective September 1, 1999:
Otto Cap SLPP025 Charcoal - Low profile.
Otto Cap TOPS025 Charcoal - Soft crown.
Otto Cap WSP025 Charcoal - Pro style.
Flex Fit Cap 6277, 6377 -grey color
Ogden City Fire Department logo only. Thread color will be navy, red, and white. No other
cap will be allowed on duty after September 1, 1999. First name or nicknames may be
embroidered on the back of the cap in navy thread color. Must receive approval from
Battalion Chief of nickname prior to ordering.
Jackets/Coats:
The following are the only approved jackets, coats, or outer wear to be worn after October 1, 1999.
No longer will sweat tops or any other outer wear be allowed as a jacket that is not listed below:
1.
Wearguard Three-In-One Parka #1308 Red/Charcoal.
2.
Charcoal fleece #SJ97 Timberline Colorado with full zipper, long sleeve.
3.
Charcoal Fleece #SV97 Timberline Colorado with full zipper vest (no sleeves)
The embroidery requirements for the daily uniform shirt are required on these outer garments. The
inner and outer coat of the Wearguard 3-1 need the same embroidery. Thread color for the fleece
(same as daily shirt). Thread color for red coat - navy, charcoal, white.
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Physical Fitness Clothing:
To maintain consistency in appearance of uniformity and to project a professional image, the following
physical fitness uniform has been developed (effective October 1,1999).
Shirt

4000 Gilden 7.0 oz. Sports Grey T-shirt. OFD embroidered insignia on left chest
(no other markings required or allowed). Thread color (same as daily uniform
shirt - red, white, navy).

Sweat shorts/
4850MP Jerzees 9 oz. with pocket 50/50 navy with OFD embroidery left leg.
Pants
Thread color - white, red, charcoal.
Sweat shirts

4662M Jerzees 9.0 oz. Oxford
71064 Lee 9.0 oz. Full zip Grey
With OFD embroidered insignia with EMS certification and approved rank on left
chest (no other markings required or allowed). Thread color navy, red, and white.
Sweat shirts are for P.T. only. Not a substitute for a response uniform coat or
station wear. Sweat shorts length will befrommid thigh to knee in length.

White socks

Required while wearing physical fitness footwear

Footwear

Appropriate footwear designed specifically for the physical fitness activity
in which you are involved. For team sports on a court or outdoor
assembly, members should wear a good quality shoe which goes above the
ankle in height and are properly laced. Problem ankles must be braced.
Ankle wraps may substitute for high shoes.

While traveling to andfromphysical fitness training, jumpsuits or bunkers will be worn over physical
fitness clothes.
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SECTION 62.

All materials around quarters, which are of no value to companies, shall be sent
to the Battalion Chief at headquarters for disposal through proper City channels.

SECTION 63.

Members will aggressively and productively participate in the on-duty physical
fitness program on a daily schedule determined by the station officer.

SECTION 64.

All members shall be responsible for security of station entryways in a manner
to assure that no person can gain access to the premises without the knowledge
of some member of the company. Doors to quarters, as far as practical, must
be closed and locked when company is absent from quarters.

SECTION 65.

The commanding officer shall be notified when mechanics or workmen enter
quarters.

SECTION 66.

All members shall familiarize themselves with and be obedient to the laws,
Rules and Regulations, manuals of operations, and orders affecting operation of
the Fire Department.

SECTION 67.

All members shall practice economy in the use of supplies and metered services
and see that waste is avoided.

SECTION 68.

All members shall be courteous and respectful in their dealings with the public
when engaged in official Fire Department activities such as company
inspections, public education activity, and emergencies.

SECTION 69.

When assigned to act in a higher rank, personnel shall accept responsibility for
the performance of the duties of that position.

SECTION 70.

All members shall keep their persons, uniforms, beds, and lockers in a neat and
clean condition. Persistence in uncleanliness or offensive habits will be grounds
for disciplinary action.

SECTION 71.

All members shall notify their immediate superior officer of all matters coming
to their attention affecting the interest and welfare of the Department.

SECTION 72.

All members shall possess a valid Utah Driver's License before operating any
Fire Department vehicle.

SECTION 73.

Members may trade time by submitting written application to the officer in
charge at least 24 hours in advance. Any trades, regardless of hours that begin
at shift change, requires a written approved trade request. Exceptions to this
are trades for four hours or less at any other time during the course of
individual's shift.
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Skirls
Light blue Paramount #8002
Short sleeve,fireresistive
Light blue Lion #8022
Long sleeve, fire resistive
Underclothing beneath this shirt, if worn, will be white in color. Underclothing shall not
extend beyond the outer garment sleeve edge.
The following patchestoadges will be on these shirts when worn:
1.
OFD patch, left shoulder
2.

NFPA certification patch, right shoulder

3.

Name tag, metallic silver or gold - first or middle name with last name black ink - no substitutes. No plastic.

4.

OFD-approved metallic badge
Department-issued OFD badge
Utah Centennial Model B971 (Ringmasters)
Sesquicentennial Spirit of Pioneering Model B971 (Ringmasters)

5.

Insignia
All fire officers and special team members will wear the insignia on their
dress shirt collar:
SWAT OPD
USAR TEAM
HAZMAT TEAM

One SWAT pin on left shirt pocket flap
One gold, metallic star on each lapel
HazMat Team Pin (as approved) on each
lapel
CAPTAIN
Two gold parallel bugles on each lapel
BATTALION CHIEF
Two gold crossed bugles on each lapel
FIRE MARSHAL
Two gold crossed bugles on each lapel
DEPUTY CHIEF
Four gold crossed bugles on each lapel
FIRE CHIEF
Five gold crossed bugles on each lapel
Bugles must be "cut out" style. Insignia is available at uniform
supply distributors.
Pins - Department-issued stork pins - no others.

Tie - Navy blue neck tie (for special occasions)
Belt - Black or navy with conservative buckle (no greater than 1-1/2"
square of overall area.
Class A Coat - Eagle #38802, Matching pants #38200 Style T-l
Lighthouse Signatureline TWUSN (includes jacket and pants).
A Class A coat/pants is optional for the rank of Captain and below. This
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UNIFORMS AND FOOTWEAR

The uniform identifies each member as a representative of the Ogden City Fire Department.
Therefore, all uniformed personnel are required to wear and maintain, in a clean condition, a
regulation Department uniform while on-duty.
I.

While wearing a uniform, the following general regulations apply:
A.

We will have a summer and winter uniform. The winter uniform will be in effect from
November 1st to May 1st. The winter uniform shirt will be the light blue button-up
(long or short sleeve). Note: The winter uniform is the same as the dress uniform.
The summer uniform shirt will be the squad shirt.

B.

The regulation uniform shall be worn by all personnel. On rare occasions, a situation
may occur where alternative clothing may be authorized by a station officer. Example:
painting projects which would cause permanent damage to a uniform.

C.

All jackets and dress shirts shall have an official Ogden City Fire Department shoulder
patch on the left shoulder.

D.

Metallic badges shall be worn on the outer garment at all times, except when wearing
the tee shirts or squad shirts with no jacket or jumpsuit with embroidered badge.

E.

Uniforms shall not be worn while off-duty, except that they may be worn while
traveling to and from duty or when making public presentations. (See exception MH"
below.)

F.

When any portion of the uniform is worn, the complete and proper uniform must be
worn. (See exception HH" below.)

G.

When conducting company inspections, public education, or as ordered, a regulation
dress uniform with patches, badge, and name tag must be worn. It is the firefighter's
responsibility to have, on hand at all times, a light blue button-up shirt for such needs.

H.

Caps, tee shirts, and squad shirts which exhibit Ogden City Fire Department
identification, logos, etc., may be worn off-duty providing the wearer conducts
himself/herself as if representing the standards of the Department. Firefighters should
be prepared to assist people in trouble while wearing shirts identifying the wearer as
fire/rescue trained personnel.
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The regulation uniform required to be maintained by Department personnel through the annual
allowance shall be as designated and specified by the Fire Chief.

A.

FIRE RESISTIVE FABRICS

All firefighters of the Department are hereby advised that non-fire resistive fabrics can burn
actively when exposed to high heat or flame impingement. This non-flame resistance quality
can contribute to firefighter injury and possible death. The policy of the Ogden City Fire
Department is to advocate and recommend fire resistive uniforms for our employees regularly
exposed to fire and fire products. The uniforms of the Fire Department, which are not fire
resistive, must be covered by approved fire resistive, protective clothing whenever a potential
for high heat or direct flame contact is probable within the scope of hostile firefighting or
rescue involvement.
The uniform choice (fire rated versus non-fire rated) is given to the individual firefighter.
However, the proper donning and use of protective firefighting clothing turnouts is not
optional and is a requirement of employment with the Ogden City Fire Department.

B.

DRESS UNIFORM

The dress uniform is to be worn for public education, company inspections, and on other
occasions at the supervisor's discretion.
All firefighters are required to maintain this uniform at the station of assignment. It must be
ready to wear upon the order of the company officer.

Uniform shorts: (Red Kap Brand PT24NV from Strauss Uniforms) are authorized to
be worn for two special event stand-bys: the Fair in August and the Street Festival in
July. They will be worn with the squad shirt and black shoes with white socks that do
not go any higher than the bottom of the calf of the leg. Note: The black shoes must
be the type approved for non-emergency station and field duties, as specified in this
regulation, with the exception of socks. You must have white socks for this uniform.
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Shirts approved:

Light blue Paramount #8002
Short sleeve, Fire resistive
light blue Lion #8022
Long sleeve, Fire resistive
Light blue Flying Cross #85R5435
Short sleeve, Non-fire resistive
White shirts in equivalent designs for Fire Prevention, Administration
(including Battalion Chiefs).

£anLappiQY£d:
These pants are to be worn with both the dress shirt and the working shirts.
Fecheimer 6.5 oz. Nomex pant (navy)
Lion Nomex Pant #602 (navy)
Topps Workhorse Twill, Non-fire resistive #3221 (navy)
Topps Squad Pant, Non-fire resistive #20320 (navy)
(Note: The squad pant includes thigh pockets.)
Pro Tuff EMS101PW (special fit for female firefighters)

Dress Uniform Patches:
OFD shoulder; EMT or Paramedic; blue plastic or metallic name tag.
Pins:
Pins, approved by the Chief, for the Hazmat and USAR Teams, and award pins are to be worn
on the uniform.
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Insignia:
All fire officers will wear the insignia of rank on uniform shirts having collars, with the
exception of the squad shirt.
To assist in identification of Fire Officers during multi-agency operations, the following
insignia should be worn on the collar of the uniform shirt, jumpsuit, and jacket:
USAR TEAM
HAZMAT TEAM
CAPTAIN
BATTALION CHIEF
FIRE MARSHAL
DEPUTY CHIEF
FIRE CHIEF

One gold, metallic star on each lapel
HazMat Team Pin (as approved) on each lapel
Two gold parallel bugles on each lapel
Two gold crossed bugles on each lapel
Two gold crossed bugles on each lapel
Four gold crossed bugles on each lapel
Five gold crossed bugles on each lapel

Bugles must be "cut out" style. Insignia is available at uniform supply distributors.
Badges:
Metallic badges which are eligible to be worn:
Department-issued OFD Badge
Utah Centennial Model B971 (Ringmasters)
Sesquicentennial Spirit of Pioneering Model B971 (Ringmasters)
C.

STAND-BY EVENTS

Stand-by event uniforms will be dictated based on the type and location of the mass gathering.
The following uniforms are designated for these specific events. For those events not
designated, the Deputy Chief over Medical Operations will designate the uniform.
Browning Center:

Dress uniform.

Fairgrounds:

Squad shirt and dress pants,
OR optional for Weber County Fair, see uniform shorts.

Ogden Street Festival:

Squad shirt and dress pants,
OR optional, see uniform shorts.
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D.

APPROVED "WORKING" UNIFORM ITEMS

NQTEl The jumpsuits shall be worn only if the person has been sleeping, is at physical
training (PT), or during bunker use, and the uses of said uniform will provide a means to get
dressed more quickly. The squad shirt shall be worn only during the summer uniform period
(April 30th to October 31st). Tee shirts may be worn only as undergarments, as PT shirts, or
when doing work at the station. Tee shirts may be worn during drill sessions as outer
garments or undergarments to proper protective gear as determined by the officer in charge of
the drill. At no time will a firefighter respond to a call wearing only a tee shirt. Important;
Dayboots are no longer approved footwear for fire response operations. Non-fire resistive
clothing must be completely covered by approved turnout gear during any hostile operations.

Approved Jumpsuits:
Topps 1408 Coveiall, 6 pockets (navy)
Toppmaster Squad-Suit T-14, 14 pockets (navy)
Toppmaster Squad-Suit T-24, 24 pockets (navy)
Mechanical Coverall, any brand (navy) for shop use only!

Insignia for Jumpsuits:
The jumpsuits must be equipped with lh«i following insignia in order to be worn by Ogden Fire
Personnel.
1.

OFD Shoulder Patch - left shoulder.

2.

EMT or Paramedic Patch - right breast (defibrillator and instructor optional).
Note: Defibrillator rockers are discontinued and will not be worn with any new
jumpsuits.

3.

NFPA Certification - right shoulder.
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4.

Name tag in embroidery - over right pocket.
a.
b.
c.
d.

5.

Last name only - first initial is okay.
Name tag on medium blue cloth backing (US Air Force color), block lettering
only.
Officer name embroidery in gold thread.
Firefighter name embroidery in silver thread.

OFD metal badge or embroidered badge patch - over left breast above pocket flap.

Approved Working Shirts: (Contact Uniform Study Team for list of vendors).
Tee Shirt:

Navy blue, Hanes Beefy T, 100% cotton.
OFD approved style embroidery logo on front, including medical
authority (i.e. EMT or Paramedic) and officer's rank or special team
status under logo. Ogden Fire/Rescue silk screen on the rear will be
allowed until May 1st, 1996; after which tees with silkscreen on the back
will not be allowed. As of July 1, 1995, lettering on the rear of the shirt
is not required.

Squad Shirt: Collared, three button ''Hartweir brand, or Print-ons Brand, or approved
equivalent in 50% cotton blend or 100% cotton, with or without pocket.
Lettering and identifications as listed for tees. Logo and lettering above
the pocket.
Topps 621 Flam X (From Strauss Uniform or A-l Uniform)
Firewear 6500 Fechheimer (From A-l or Eagle)
NOTE: The two shirts above are fire resistive fabrics.
BeliSI

Black with conservative buckle.

Blauer Commando 200 Sweaters:
(with or without zipper), navy blue, V-neck or Crew neck.

Baseball-style Cap:
Alive 1004 only, navy. Same embroidery logo as tees. Officers should order
their caps with gold rope.

b.

*J
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Mechanical jumpsuits are for shop use only and are not considered a part of your
uniform.
1.

Insignia for jumpsuits
The following is required on jumpsuit use:
a.
b.
c.
d.

e.

OFD patch, left shoulder
NFPA patch, right shoulder
EMT/Paramedic patch, right chest
Name tag embroidered - above right chest pocket
(1)
Name tag on medium blue cloth backing (USAF color), block
lettering only
(2)
Officer thread color - gold
Firefighter thread color - silver
OFD metal badge or embroidered badge patch, left chest OFD approved
metallic badge
MfSCFJJiANEQUS

Baseball-style cap - Effective September 1,1999:
Otto Cap SLPP025 Charcoal - Low profile.
Otto Cap TOPS025 Charcoal - Soft crown.
Otto Cap WSP025 Charcoal - Pro style.
Ogden City Fire Department logo only. Thread color will be navy, red, and white. No other cap
will be allowed on duty after September 1,1999. First name or nicknames may be embroidered
on the back of the cap in navy thread color. Must receive approval from Battalion Chief of
nickname prior to ordering.
Jackets/Coats:
The following are the only approved jackets, coats, or outer wear to be worn after October 1,1999. No
longer will sweat tops or any other outer wear be allowed as a jacket that is not listed below:
1.
Wearguard Three-In-One Parka #1308 Red/Charcoal.
2.
Charcoalfleece#SJ97 Timberline Colorado with full zipper, long sleeve.
3.
Charcoal Fleece #SV97 Timberline Colorado with full zipper vest (no sleeves)
The embroidery requirements for the daily uniform shirt are required on these outer garments. The
inner and outer coat of the Wearguard 3-1 need the same embroidery. Thread color for the fleece (same
as daily shirt). Thread color for red coat - navy, charcoal, white.
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Trooper Winter Cap:
Navy blue cloth-top model.

Stocking Cap:
Navy blue with or without face mask.

Reflective Tape:
1/2 hour prior to dusk and until dawn, the fire helmet or fire turnout coat must be worn
while working near any traffic for visibility and head protection.
Forest Service Gear:
May be worn for wildland firefighting, if available.
PT Clothing:
Dark blue shirts, shorts, sweats. (See regulation for footweat specifications.)
Department logo is required on the Tee shirt or sweat shirt, but optional on shorts or
sweat pants.
Chief Officers and Fire Prevention:
Chief officers are authorized to wear the white Flying Cross uniform shirts with proper
insignia year round. Navy blue pant and tie are correct colors with white shirt. Tie is
optional. (See Section G of this regulation for Fire Prevention options.)
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CHAPTER 9
•MPLOYEE CONDUCT AND DISCIPLINARY ACTION

SECTION:
9-1:
9-2;
9-3:
9-4:
9-5:
9-6:
9-7:
9-8:
9-9:

Drug And Alcohol Use And Fitness For Duty
Sexual Harassment
Other Unlawful Harassment Or Discrimination
Attendance And Punctuality
Personal Appearance
Employee Conduct And Work Rules
Conflict Resolution
Predetermination Hearing
Appeals Procedures

9-1:

DRUG AND ALCOHOL USE AND FITNESS FOR DUTY: See
drug and alcohol use and fitness for duty policy in this
manual- (Eff. 6-1-1996)
9-2:

SEXUAL HARASSMENT:

A.

Prohibited: The city is committed to providing a work environment
that is free of discrimination and unlawful sexual harassment.
Actions, words, jokes or comments based on an individual's sex will
not be tolerated. As a unique form of illegal discrimination, sexual
harassment (both overt and subtle) is a form of employee
misconduct that is demeaning to another person, undermines the
integrity of the employment relationship and is strictly prohibited.

B.

Forms Of Harassment:
1. Sexual harassment can take many forms. When a supervisor
propositions a subordinate, or suggests or makes clear that the
acceptance or granting of sexual favors are conditions of
employment or future employment, including promotional
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opportunities, such behavior can constitute sexual harassment and is
strictly prohibited by Ogden City.
2. Moreover, sexual harassment can take many direct, less obvious
forms. Faxing, posting, sending or displaying sexually connotative
pictures, literature or material offensive to another and based on
one's sex is entirely unacceptable and is strictly prohibited by Ogden
City. Less direct, and more subtle forms of sexual harassment may
occur when a supervisor or an employer allows a working
environment or condition to exist which is intimidating or hostile on
account of one's sex. Such a hostile or intimidating work
environment is said to exist when a person's sex is the object of
ridicule, put-down, derisive and inappropriate behavior, gesture or
commentary. Ogling, staring, smirking and other visual and
nonverbal behaviors can serve as a basis of complaints of unwanted,
sexual harassment.
Unwanted Behavior Or Action: Whenever behavior or action occurs
toward another on the basis of one's sex, which is unwanted,
unwelcome and unreciprocated, sexual harassment may occur and is
strictly prohibited by Ogden City.
Reporting By Employee: Any employee who wants to report an
incident of sexual harassment should promptly report the matter to
his or her supervisor. If the supervisor is unavailable or the
employee believes it would be inappropriate to contact that person,
the employee should immediately contact any of the following: the
city attorney, the chief administrative officer, the director of
management services, the personnel officer or a management
member of the city's administration who is of the same sex.
Employees can raise concerns and make reports without fear of
reprisal.
Investigation: Any supervisor or manager who becomes aware of
possible sexual harassment should promptly advise the personnel
office or any member of management who will report the concern to
the equal employment opportunity (EEO) officer of the city, who is
the director of management services. The director of management
services will conduct a timely and confidential investigation of all
claims or reports of sexual harassment. The director of management
services may delegate a representative or agent to conduct fact
finding on their behalf and in the interests of timeliness and in
accordance with this policy. As part of the investigation, the director
of management services or their designee shall meet with the
employee bringing the complaint to determine the nature of the
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harassment, make inquiry about what remedy the employee is
seeking, and otherwise determine the focus of the investigation.
F.

Determination Of Harassment: Should the investigation disclose
evidence and record exists on which to determine that sexual
harassment has occurred, the individual(s) found engaging in such
prohibited activity will be subject to serious disciplinary action, up to
and including termination of employment. Consideration will be given
to the nature of the harassment, the severity of the harassment and
the circumstances of the harassment. During an investigation, the
department director, with the approval of the director of management
services, shall have the authority to temporarily restructure work
assignments, change work conditions and separate involved and
interested parties in the interest of maintaining a work environment
free from any potential threat, hostility or intimidation. While all
materials, records and notes about the investigation shall remain
confidential, any disciplinary action taken as the result of such
investigation shall be made a matter of record in the involved
employee's personnel file.

G.

Time Frame Of Investigation: Investigations shall include interviews
with individuals involved in, or who have knowledge of the events,
circumstances or conditions surrounding any complaint of sexual
harassment. Investigations shall be conducted and concluded within
reasonable time frames generally not to exceed thirty (30) days.
Investigations shall report and record findings of fact, conclusions
based upon those facts, including reasonable beliefs supported by
evidence and record, and shall make recommendations for action to
the director of management services.

H.

Action Of Director: The director of management services shall, upon
the completion of an investigation, act within thirty (30) days on the
investigation's findings of fact, conclusions and recommendations to
determine what, if any, disciplinary action should be taken. The
director of management services shall review the investigation with
appropriate city counsel and review what action is contemplated. In
addition to disciplinary action, the chief administrative officer has the
right to direct an appropriate and reasonable remedy to work
conditions, or to direct a change in procedures, and otherwise act to
correct, modify or change work environments in order to enforce this
policy.

I.

Communication Of Conclusion: The director of management services
shall communicate the conclusion(s) of the investigation and
whatever action is deemed appropriate to the employee bringing the
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complaint, and shall communicate the same to the employee
accused of the harassment. (Eff. 6-1-1996)
OTHER UNLAWFUL HARASSMENT OR DISCRIMINATION:
Prohibited: The city is committed to, providing a work environment
that is free of discrimination and any unlawful harassment. Actions,
words, jokes or comments based on an individual's sex, race,
ethnicity, age, religion, handicap, disability or any other legally
protected characteristic will not be tolerated.
Policy: It is the policy of the city to prohibit any unlawful harassment
and discrimination. As is stated above in this manual, sexual'
harassment is illegal and shall be treated as a serious violation of
the city's policy and work standards. Other forms of illegal
harassment can occur with respect to any legally protected
characteristic of an individual. Accordingly, any illegal discrimination
or harassment shall also be treated as a serious violation of the
city's policy and work standards.
Forms Of Discrimination Or Harassment: Illegal discrimination or
harassment can take many forms. Making fun of a coworker based
on their mental or physical limitation, or denying an impaired
employee access to work areas/services which others enjoy or are
authorized to use, are examples of possible illegal discrimination or
harassment.
Reporting By Employee: Any employee who believes they have been
the victim of any illegal discrimination or harassment, should
promptly report the matter to his or her supervisor. If the supervisor
is unavailable or the employee believes it would be inappropriate to
contact that person, the employee should immediately contact any of
the following: the city attorney, the chief administrative officer, the
director of management services or the personnel officer. Employees
can raise concerns and make reports without fear of reprisal.
Investigation: In accordance with the affirmative action appeals
process, the equal employment opportunity (EEO) officer, who is the
director of management services, shall conduct an investigation with
respect to all claims and complaints about illegal discrimination or
harassment. The director of management services will conduct a
timely and confidential investigation of all claims or reports of illegal
harassment. The director of management services may delegate a
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representative or agent to conduct fact finding on their behalf and in
the interests of timeliness and in accordance with this policy. As part
of the investigation, the director of management services or their
designee shall meet with the employee bringing the complaint to
determine the nature of the harassment, make inquiry about what
remedy the employee is seeking, and otherwise determine the focus
of the investigation.
Illegal Activity Determined: Should evidence and records in the
investigation disclose that illegal activity or action has occurred,
appropriate disciplinary action, up to and including discharge, shall
be taken by the city to, correct and/or resolve a problem.
Consideration will be given to the nature, the severity and the
circumstances of the harassment. While all materials, records and
notes about the investigation shall remain confidential, any
disciplinary action taken as the result of such proceeding shall be
made a matter of record in the involved employee's personnel file.
Temporary Restructuring: During an investigation, the department
director, with the approval of the director of management services,
shall have the authority to temporarily restructure work assignments,
change work conditions, and separate involved and interested
parties in the interest of maintaining a work environment free from
any potential threat, hostility or intimidation.
Time Frame Of Investigation: Investigations shall include interviews
with individuals involved in, or who have knowledge of the events,
circumstances or conditions surrounding any complaint of
harassment or discrimination. Investigations shall be conducted and
concluded within reasonable time frames generally not to exceed
thirty (30) days. Investigations shall report and record findings of
fact, conclusions based upon those facts, including reasonable
beliefs supported by evidence and record, and shall make
recommendations for action to the director of management services.
Action Of Director: The director of management services shall, upon
the completion of an investigation, act within thirty (30) days on the
investigation's findings of fact, conclusions and recommendations to
determine what, if any, disciplinary action should be taken. In
addition to disciplinary action, the chief administrative officer has the
right to direct an appropriate and reasonable remedy to work
conditions, or to direct a change in procedures, and otherwise act to
correct, modify or change work environments in order to enforce this
policy.
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J.

9-4:

Communication Of Conclusion: The director of management services
shall communicate the conclusion(s) of the investigation and
whatever action is deemed appropriate to the employee bringing the
complaint, and shall communicate the same to the employee
accuspd of the harassment. (Eff. 6-1-1996)

ATTENDANCE AND PUNCTUALITY:

A.

City Expectations: To maintain a safe and productive work
environment, the city expects employees to be reliable and to be
punctual in reporting for scheduled work. Absenteeism and tardiness
place a burden on other employees and on the city. In the rare
instances when employees cannot avoid being late to work or are
unable to work as scheduled, they should notify their supervisor as
soon as possible in advance of the anticipated tardiness or absence.

B.

Reporting: Employees are required to report all absences.
Department directors and their designees have the right to inquire of
an employee as to any reason(s)( for repeated, excessive or
unexcused absenteeism or tardiness. Poor attendance and repeated
tardiness are disruptive. Either may lead to disciplinary action, up to
and including termination of employment

C.

Incarceration: In the case of incarceration and an inability to report
for work when scheduled, employees are required to notify their
immediate supervisor or their department director immediately. (Eff.
6-1-1996)

9-5:
A.

PERSONAL APPEARANCE:
Acceptable Appearance Required: Dress, grooming and personal
cleanliness standards contribute to the morale of all employees and
can affect the business and professional image the city presents to
patrons and visitors. During business hours, employees are expected
to present a clean and neat appearance and to dress according to
the requirements of their positions. Employees who appear for work
inappropriately dressed will be sent home and directed to return to
work in proper attire. Under such circumstances, employees will not
be compensated for the time away from work, and shall not be
eligible to use or apply other paid time off.
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B.

Questions: Consult your supervisor or department director if you
have questions as to what constitutes appropriate attire. (Eft.
6-1-1996)

9-6:

EMPLOYEE CONDUCT AND WORK RULES: To ensure
orderly operations and provide the best possible work
environment, the city expects employees to follow rules of conduct that will
protect the interests and safety of all employees and the organization.
Violations of the city's rules of conduct may result in disciplinary action, up
to and including termination of employment.
A.

Violations Of Rules Of Conduct: Many of these rules of conduct are
outlined in other sections of this manual. The following are examples
of violations of rules of conduct contained in this manual:
1. Any behavior, event or condition which violates the conditions of
employment with the city as described in any policy in this manual.
2. Any behavior or event which is a conflict of interest, or divulges
confidential information for which a policy exists prohibiting such
release or publication. (See the city's conflicts of interest and
nondisclosure policy in this manua}.)
3. Unauthorized or unacceptable use of city equipment or property
as described in the city's personal use of vehicles, use of equipment
and vehicles and use of electronic communications and mail system
policies.
4. A violation of the city's safety standards as discussed in the safety
policy.
5. A violation of the city's overtime policy rules and standards.
6. A violation of the work schedules policy in this manual when a
change in a work schedule or work activity is unauthorized and
unapproved, irrespective of whether the employee benefits from such
violation.
7. A violation of the city's sexual harassment or other unlawful
harassment policies or any state or federal law prohibiting
discrimination against individuals in protected groups or classes.
8. Any behavior or event which subjects an employee to disciplinary
review as part of the city's fitness for duty policies.

Ogden City Employee Manual

9-6
9. Working under the influence of alcohol or illegal drugs or while
abusing legal drugs.
10. Possession, distribution, sale, transfer or use of alcohol or illegal
drugs,in the workplace, while on duty, or while operating city-owned
vehicles and equipment
11. Unexcused or excessive absenteeism or any absence without
notice; excessive or unexcused tardiness.
12. Violations of the city's fitness for duty policy.
Behavior Resulting In Disciplinary Action: In addition to the policies
outlined in this manual, the following behavior or conduct may result
in disciplinary action, up to and including termination of employment:
1. Actions which violate city ordinances or other local, state or
federal laws; including statements or comments which serve as proof
or an admission of proof that the employee violated such laws,
whether or not a conviction occurred with respect to such violation.
2. Actions which violate administrative or executive orders of the
mayor.
3. Violations of applicable departmental rules and procedures.
4. Violations of personnel policies.
5. Theft or inappropriate removal or possession of property.
6. Falsification of any city records, including personnel records,
timekeeping records, employee expense reimbursement requests,
etc.
7. Behavior or activity which reflects an intent to be dishonest or
untruthful.
8. Insubordination or disrespectful conduct or language toward
members of the public, superiors or other employees.
9. Actions which serve to discredit the name, reputation or public
mission or interest of the city.
10. Negligence or improper conduct leading to bodily injury or
damage of city-owned property or the property of third parties.
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11. Boisterous or disruptive activity in the workplace; behavior or
activity which serves to create disharmony or a disorderly
environment without regard for the interest of the city in conducting
its business in an efficient, effective and orderly manner.
12. Fighting or threatening violence in the workplace.
13. Smoking in prohibited areas.
14. Possession of dangerous weapons or materials, such as firearms
or explosives, except as required or authorized within the
employee's scope of employment.
15. Violation of safety or health rules establish by the city or its
departments or divisions, or other safety or health rules or
regulations as governed by applicable code or competent authority.
16. Unauthorized use of telephones, electronic communications or
mail systems, city-owned computers and software, or other
city-owned equipment or property.
17. Unsatisfactory performance or conduct.
18. Unauthorized absence from work station during the workday.
Employee Treatment Policy: It is the policy of the city to seek
reasonable and consistent treatment of all employees and to
encourage positive and cooperative relationships among full-time
and part-time employees and between employees and supervisors.
Nonetheless, the city recognizes that from time to time disputes may
arise over actions or discipline as the result of enforcement or
interpretation of the policies and procedures of the city and in its
manual. Severe or serious disciplinary action may result in
suspension, demotion or termination of employees within the scope
of the city's policies and procedures.
Existence Of Problem Or Grievance: When an employee believes a
problem or grievance exists which impairs his/her effectiveness in
work accomplishment, he/she should seek to solve any problem or
dispute first by discussion with their immediate supervisor. It is the
intent of the city to foster relations between employees that are
conducive to effective work results by discussing and resolving
issues at the lowest possible level.
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Specific And More Serious Matters: In cases where actions and
events involve other, specific or more serious matters including but
not limited to: sexual or other unlawful harassment, drug/alcohol
policy violations, illegal discrimination allegations, and severe
discipline which includes suspension, demotion or discharge, the city
has set forth other policy to address those issues, as found
elsewhere in this manual. (See the predetermination review and
appeals procedures policies in this manual.) Employees are
encouraged to contact their department director or the personnel
office for information related to filing a grievance or an appeal.
Mutual Consent Employment: Employment with the city is at the
mutual consent of the city and the employee, and either party may
terminate that relationship at any time. Those employees who are
not full-time or qualified, part-time, employees and who do not
otherwise enjoy certain job protections within a service classification
may be discharged with or without cause at any time. Full-time and
qualified, part-time employees in classified and merit service
employment categories enjoy rights to appeal certain disciplinary
actions taken with respect to their jobs, however, the "at will"
employment relationship is not altered thereby. (See
predetermination hearings and appeals hearings policies found in
this manual.) (Eft. 6-1-1996)
CONFLICT RESOLUTION:
Intent: It is the intent of the city to develop and encourage consistent
and clear policies that reflect the standards of work and expected
conduct applicable to each employee's position and job
requirements. Issues and conflicts can arise in the process of
applying and enforcing city policies and procedures. It is the policy of
the city that, where and to the extent practicable, issues and
conflicts within the work setting and environment be resolved at the
lowest possible level in an informal manner that appropriately
reflects respect and good faith between individuals.
Supervisor: When employees are concerned about issues or events
pertaining to their work conditions, work environment or their own
jobs, they are expected and encouraged to openly and frankly
discuss their concerns directly with their immediate supervisor. If an
employee believes it would not be appropriate to discuss a concern
with his/her immediate supervisor, then the employee is encouraged
to discuss the concern with the next level of supervision in his/her
department. In cases where the employee believes it would not be
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BEFORE THE OGDEN CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

IN THE MATTER OF
DANIEL HARMON

OGDEN CITY'S BRIEF TO THE
OGDEN CIVIL SERVICE
COMMISSION, ON REMAND FROM
THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

Ogden City (the "City") respectfully submits this brief to the Ogden Civil Service
Commission ("Commission").
INTRODUCTION
On June 16, 2005, the Utah Court of Appeals reversed the Commission's November 20,
2003 majority (2 to 1) decision which had reversed Chief Mike Mathieu's termination of Captain
Daniel Harmon ("Harmon") from the Ogden Fire Department ("OFD"). The Court remanded
this matter to the Commission with instructions regarding what the Commission should consider
upon remand.1 Specifically, the Court of Appeals instructed the Commission to consider all of
the various incidents of Harmon's misconduct, including Chief Mathieu's determination that
Harmon had been dishonest in responding to the Chiefs questions during one of the
predetermination hearings. The Court of Appeals further instructed the Commission to give

1

At a hearing before the Commission on November 10, 2005, counsel for the City and
Harmon agreed that no further evidence would be considered on remand, and that the record
provided to the Court of Appeals would be the record on remand.

deference to Chief Mahieu's decision and to uphold the decision if it finds that Harmon's
misconduct warranted termination.
Based upon the facts of this case, and the standard of review that the Court of Appeals
has instructed the Commission to apply, the City respectfully submits that the Commission
should uphold Chief Mathieu's decision to terminated Harmon. Given the nature of Harmon's
repeated and egregious misconduct and lack of judgement, which is undisputed, that fact that
Harmon was untruthful with Chief Mathieu, and the fact that Harmon was a Captain who is held
to a higher standard, the decision to terminate Harmon is fully justified and warranted. If the
City cannot terminate Harmon under the facts of this case, one is left to wonder what an
employee would have to do to warrant termination.
THE COURT OF APPEALS' INSTRUCTIONS ON REMAND
The Court of Appeals gave the following instructions to the Commission as to how the
Commission is to proceed on remand:
(1)

The Commission must take into consideration all of the following:
(a)

the Shower Incident where Harmon urinated into a shower stall where
another OFD employee was showering;

(b)

the Zucchini Incident where Harmon showed a zucchini to a female
subordinate and asked 'is this big enough"?;

(c)

the fact that, throughout his tenure as a Captain, Harmon tolerated and
participated in a form of sexually-oriented horseplay among male
firefighters where, fully clothed, they would "imitate sexual intercourse
with each other" ("Horseplay Incidents");

(d)

the MDA Incident where Harmon "coordinated a fund-raising event" "in
which he permitted female entertainers to pose topless with firefighters";

(e)

the Weedkiller Incident where Harmon and two otherfirefightersfilleda
bottle with their urine, which a retired battalion chief later picked up
believing it to be the weedkiller which Harmon had promised to him;

(f)

the Drafting Pit Incident, where Harmon bared his genitals and publicly
urinated into a drafting pit, or water reservoir, being used by his and
another fire crew; and

(g)

the fact that Harmon missed a training session meeting for the fourth time
in 18 months after being warned and cautioned to correct this deficient
behavior.

See Opinion by Court of Appeals ("Opinion"), pp. 2-5.
(2)

In addition, the Court of Appeals specifically instructed the Commission that it

must "address each of the grounds for termination cited by the department head," including the
"dishonesty" issue; i.e., that Chief Mathieu found that Harmon had been "untruthful or dishonest
in responding to questions in the December 11, 2000 Fire Department predetermination hearing."
Opinion, p. 5.
(3)

Based on its consideration of these facts, the Court of Appeals stated that the

"Commission must affirm the sanction [of dismissal] if it is (1) appropriate to the offense and (2)
consistent with previous sanctions imposed by the department." Opinion, p. 6. The Court of
Appeals, however, stated that the Commission has already determined that there is no
inconsistency, and the Commission is not to revisit that issue on remand.2 Thus, the primary
issue for the Commission to consider on remand is whether termination is appropriate.3 In
deciding this issue, the Commission must take into account all of the following instances of
Harmon's misconduct: (1) the MDA Incident; (2) the Weedkiller Incident; (3) the Horseplay
Incidents; (4) the Zucchini Incident; (5) the Drafting Pit Incident; (6) the Shower Incident; (7) the
fact that Chief Mathieu believed Harmon to have been untruthful or dishonest in responding to
2

This means that the Commission has already decided that Mr. Harmon failed to meet his
burden to show that he had been treated differently than other similarly-situatedfirefighterswere
treated as to discipline.
3

All citations are to the Record on appeal, and cite the specific page of the Record, i.e., R.
152 means page 152 of the Record before the Court of Appeals.

questions about the Weedkiller Incident; (8) Harmon's past performance evaluations and
disciplinary record, including the fact that he missed four OFD meetings in the eighteen months
prior to his termination despite being warned and cautioned to correct his deficient behavior; and
(9) the fact that Harmon was a Captain and supervisor.
RELEVANT FACTS
I.

HARMON'S WORK PERFORMANCE,
1.

Harmon was hired by the City as a firefighter on September 10,1979. R. 143.

He became a captain on March 2, 1991 and held that position until he was terminated on
December 15,2000. R. 431.
2.

As a member of OFD, Harmon was trained in preventing sexual harassment, and

signed acknowledgments of receipt of sexual harassment prevention information and/or having
received training on the City's "No Harassment Policy" numerous times. R. 364-69
(acknowledgments signed by Harmon 12/18/93; 12/29/94; 8/20/96; 10/28/98; 9/8/99).
3.

Harmon's annual employee evaluations from February 17, 1991 through March

2000, reflect that he typically received mid-range marks, and wasfrequentlycautioned and
received low marks because he failed to stay on-task and had problems in his personal relations
with co-workers. See R. 375-471 (evaluations); see also R. 1773-2022 (Comm. Hrg. Trans.).
4.

From approximately 1995 through 2000, Harmon's performance deteriorated. On

December 13, 1995, he received a Second Written Warning cautioning him about his poor work
performance, inefficient work habits, failure to discipline subordinates, conflicts with peer
supervisors, and failure to stay on-task including failing to provide timely evaluations. R. 278,
388.
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5.

Harmon's annual evaluations show similar problems. His 1996 annual evaluation

notes he has "trouble working with others on a mutual respect basis," and he received
"marginal" scores on that evaluation in leadership, planning/organization, personnel
management/interpersonal skills, meeting schedules/ utilizing resources, and
flexibility/adaptability/initiative. R. 403-06.
6.

Harmon's March 3,1997 annual evaluation expressed concerns with his problems

in "sizing up" and prioritizing tasks, and the evaluator was concerned about his reliability. R.
439.
7.

In his March 3,1998, annual evaluation, Harmon again received "marginal" in the

categories of planning/organization, and meeting schedules/utilizing resources. See R. 446-54.
8.

In Harmon's March 2, 2000, evaluation, the evaluator stated he had good

leadership traits and his crew liked him, but that his crew did not trust him because he had
problems fulfilling his duties. R. 465.
9.

Harmon scored "marginal" in the 2000 evaluation for productivity/efficiency, and

for meeting schedules/utilizing resources. R. 466-67.
10.

OFD records show other concerns about Harmon's performance and reliability in

the most recent years preceding his termination. On April 19, 1998, he was counseled about
leaving his assigned location at afirewithout informing the Incident Commander. R. 444; R.
2014. In addition, from June 1999 to November 2000, Harmon failed to attend:
(a)

a June 10, 1999, workgroup leaders meeting (he was Team Leader)

because he claimed that he "spaced it" (R. 458);
(b)

a August 17, 1999, CPR class for reservists that he had scheduled

and where he was an instructor (R. 289);

(c)

a September 18,1999, Reserve Corps meeting that he had set up as

the Team Leader (R. 289);
(d)

a November 14,2000 class he was supposed to teach, which had

been set for eight months and was shown on posted yearly and monthly calendars
(R. 473-74).
11.

On November 11,1999, Harmon received a Notice of Caution for missing the

1999 meetings, and was removed as Team Leader. R, 289.
II.

INCIDENTS OF HARMON'S MISCONDUCT.
A.

The MDA Incident.

12.

Harmon told the investigators that he knew that the women preparing the meal at

the MDA event would be wearing swimsuits, and that when he saw that one woman had changed
into a "g-string" thong bikini bottom to pose for photos, he got his Captain's helmet out of the
ambulance he was driving so that she could pose with the helmet, R. 494-95,498.
13.

While discussing photos taken of the woman at the MDA event, Harmon said that

he used a disposable camera to "get a butt shot of her standing with her butt toward the camera"
while she was wearing his helmet. R. 498.
14.

Harmon said he later was surprised to see the woman had taken off her bikini top

and was posing for photos while lying on a cot in the ambulance with firemen sitting on the
squad bench around her. R. 500. He stated that he "should have stopped it right there," but did
not because he was "enthused by it also." R. 500. He told investigators that he instead left (R.
501), and that he later "heard that she had some more pictures taken downstairs and that they
were worse than the pictures upstairs" (R. 508).

15.

Harmon told investigators that he led the effort to hide what had taken place at the

MDA event, and that he made sure they got "rid of the frigging film." R. 504-06; 1588-59. He
admitted to the Commission that he led the effort to get rid of the photos. R. 2657,2659.
B.

The Horseplay Incidents.

16.

At the first predetermination hearing, Harmon admitted it was not appropriate for

him "as a Captain, as a supervisor," to participate in an act of dry-humping other firefighters"
and that he had done that (R. 328).
17.

Deputy Chief Chamberlain testified at the Commission Hearing that Harmon

admitted participating in the dry-humping conduct, and that "as a supervisor, he was failing to
stop that conduct amongst his subordinates," and that Harmon "'viewed this as appropriate
behavior as long as it was male to male but wrong if male to female." R. 1604-06. Deputy Chief
Chamberlain testified that he agreed that investigators found this was "pattern behavior related to
poor judgment and poor leadership." R. 1606.
18.

The Affidavit of the woman involved in the Zucchini Incident was read at the

Commission Hearing. This stated: "I have observed Captain Harmon and members of his crew
engage in dry-humping, where one person is standing behind another person would reach into the
front pockets of the forward person, causing the forward person to bend over, after which the rear
person would mimic the pelvic thrusts of a sex act. It was considered a joke.... I have observed
Captain Harmon participate in this activity both in the rear and forward positions." R. 2078.
19.

Except for Harmon, the woman involved in the Zucchini Incident testified at the

Hearing that she "wouldn't swear under oath" that she had ever seen an officer other than
Harmon present during a dry-humping incident, but they might have been. R. 2477.

C.

The Zucchini Incident.

20.

At the Commission Hearing, James Bristow, Ogden City Human Resources

Manager, testified regarding sexual harassment training that "[w]e basically teach employees,
supervisors to keep sexual issues out of the workplace." R. 2216.
21.

The Zucchini Incident involved Ms. Cassidy, who was a female probationary

employee who was supervised by Harmon. R. 479. The Zucchini Incident took place in
November of 1998 when Ms. Cassidy held up a cucumber or zucchini in front of the whole crew
and said "Do you know what they call these where I'mfrom—'homewreckers.'" In response,
everyone laughed. Later, when Ms. Cassidy was on the phone, Harmon showed her a greased
zucchini or cucumber and asked her, with a sexual connotation, "Is this big enough?". R. 151.
22.

At the first predetermination hearing, Harmon admitted he thought his female

probationary subordinate's joke about zucchini as "homewreckers" was "somewhat"
inappropriate but that he did not caution her about the "inappropriate nature of that joke in the
workplace," and admitted that his response to the woman had a sexual connotation. R. 21432144.
D.

The Shower Incident.

23.

Steve Gunnell ("Gunnell") testified at the Commission Hearing that he was taking

a shower in a personal shower stall when Harmon opened the door and "started urinating in my
shower." R. 2436. He said that he has never heard of anyone at OFD urinating into a shower
where someone was showering (R. 2437), and that he "was shocked," and thought it "was kind
of disrespectful" (R. 2437).
24.

The following facts established that Harmon was Gunnell's superior at the time of

the Shower Incident:

a.

Harmon was hired as afirefightby the Department on September 10,

1979. R. 143. Gunnell was hired as a firefighter by the Department in 1988. R. 2435.
b.

Harmon testified that he became probationary acting captain in the

Department in 1990. R. 2644.
c.

Harmon testified that he was a probationary acting captain in the

Department for six months before he was removed from probation and became a Captain
on March 2,1991. R. 431; R. 2644-45.
d.

Gunnell testified that the Shower Incident took place between about 1990

and 1993.
e.

Gunnell answered "yes" when asked whether Harmon had "seniority over

him." R. 2440-41.
f.

OFD Rules & Regulations: (i) define "subordinate" as: "[a] member who

stands in order of rank below another" (R. 3008); and (ii) state that "[w]hen two or more
members below the rank of Captain find themselves in a position which requires
command action, the member with the most time in the highest grade will assume
command until relieved by a superior officer" R. 3009.
g.

Responding to the question "Does the relative seniority between two

firefighters determine who calls the shots" "when a captain, a battalion chief, or someone
else is not available," Harmon testified "Yeah, the senior firefighter." R. 1259.
h.

Chief Mathieu testified at the Hearing that when twofirefightersare the

same rank, the one who was promoted earlier is the superior. R. 2289.

E.

The Drafting Pit Incident.

25.

Chief Mathieu testified at the Commission Hearing that the training facility where

the drafting pit is located sits back onto 12th Street and can be seen from public view through the
surrounding chain link fence. R. 1834, 1850. He responded "yes, I do" when asked by
Harmon's attorney whether he believed that Harmon's "exposing his genitals caused your other
male firefighters affront or alarm." R. 1835. Chief Mathieu stated that "[i]t was told to me by
some of the members present that they were totally caught off guard, totally surprised, thought it
was a totally inappropriate act," and that when urinating into the drafting pit Harmon said 'Til
fill it up." R. 1837.
26.

Chief Mathieu testified at the Commission Hearing that somefirefighterssaid "it

was bizarre and they couldn't imagine that somebody would do that in front of them, that would
just expose themselves and urinate into the drafting pit." R. 1838. He testified that some
firefighters told him that when they were opening lids to take water out of the pit, "Dan made a
gesture, says Let me fill it up or I'll fill it up and, that's when the urination began." R. 1847-48;
R. 2295-96. Chief Mathieu also testified that OFD trainees were present at the drafting pit when
the incident occurred. R. 1849; R. 2294.
27.

Gunnell testified at the Commission Hearing that he was standing about four to

five feet away from Harmon, on the other side of the pit. R. 2442-43. He testified that someone
commented that the "drafting pit was getting low, and [Harmon] said that he'd help fill it up or
something like that." R. 2444. Gunnell testified he thought that Harmon's intent was to shock
(R. 2444), and that Gunnell's reaction was "I was surprised, somewhat shocked, and just turned
and walked away" (R. 2445). Gunnell testified that anotherfirefighter,Dennis Kennedy,
appeared upset and commented "I can't believe he did that." R. 2445, 2447.

28.

OFD firefighter Stephen Reynolds was present at the drafting pit, standing behind

a truck. R. 2561. At the Commission Hearing, he testified he did not see Harmon urinate, but
that he later refused to take the hose out of the pit because of the urine and because he "didn't
want to touch the hose." R. 2562.
29.

Harmon testified at the Commission Hearing that he urinated into the pit because

"I had to go real bad," and the restroom in the drill tower was locked and that it is a "real pain" to
get the key. R. 1277.
F.

The Weedkiller Incident

30.

Chief Mathieu testified at the Commission Hearing that based on what he had

learned and the surrounding circumstances, he did not believe the urination into the bottle was
intended to be a practical joke. R. 2372. He stated that he considered Harmon's testimony in his
deposition about whether he had urinated into the bottle as "a contradiction of his denial at the
second predetermination hearing." R. 2383.
31.

Harmon testified at the Commission Hearing that he left the bottle containing

urine on or under the counter, and that he later learned that the former battalion chief had picked
it up and left a $20 bill on the counter. R. 2709-11. He testified he did not intend the battalion
chief to have the bottle of urine. R. 1313. He testified that urinating into the bottle was a
"symbolic act of defiance" by himself and his crew against the battalion chief (R. 2708, 2773),
and that he viewed urinating into the bottle as "a fire house joke," and as a "camaraderie building
experience" (R. 2774-75). He testified he "completely approved of [the incident] up to the point
[the battalion chief] received [the urine-filled bottle]," and that his only culpability was not
removing the bottle before the battalion chief got it. R. 2776-77. He said he joked about the
battalion chief "walking around his yard spraying urine on his lawn." R. 2778.

III.

HARMON'S ADMISSIONS.
32.

At the first predetermination hearing, Harmon admitted that as a supervisor, he

was responsible for "workplace conduct of introductoryfirefighters,"and that as a supervisor, he
established "what is acceptable and what is not acceptable" for his subordinates. R. 327.
33.

At the Commission Hearing, Harmon agreed: (1) "with the axiom a leader sets up,

leads by example'; (2) "that a leader is assigned and takes responsibility, takes responsibility for
his actions and is always ready to be held accountable"; and (3) "the leader makes [] decisions
based on his judgment and, therefore, is also held accountable if something goes wrong." R.
2821-22.
34.

At the Commission Hearing, Harmon agreed that "a captain is to be an example to

his crew." R. 1257. He agreed it was his "duty as a captain to train [a new] employee to know
what is appropriate and not appropriate in the Ogden City Fire Department." R. 1258.
35.

At the Commission Hearing, Harmon testified that the Zucchini, Shower, and

Drafting Pit Incidents were "inappropriate actions" and "stupid things to do." R. 2832-34. He
testified that his understanding of "sexual harassment" is there "is no sexual harassment unless
and until there is a complaint of sexual harassment." R. 2839.
IV.

CHIEF MATHIEU'S DETERMINATION AS TO HARMON'S DISHONESTY.
36.

At the first predetermination hearing on December 1, 2000, Harmon admitted the

MDA, Zucchini, and Horseplay Incidents, including that he asked the thong-clad Budweiser Girl
to pose with his own helmet (see R. 317-23, 325-27).
37.

On December 8, 2000, before issuing his decision, Chief Mathieu sent a letter to

Harmon stating he had just learned of three additional allegations of misconduct involving
Harmon, namely the Shower, Drafting Pit and Weedkiller Incidents. R. 342. Chief Mathieu

testified at the Commission Hearing that he saw a pattern of "inappropriate behavior" by Harmon
with respect to these three incidents. R. 1733.
38.

Harmon testified at the Commission Hearing that he was waiting for the second

predetermination hearing to start when Chief Mathieu came out to ask him to come in. R. 2686.
Harmon testified that at that point he handed Chief Mathieu a letter that he had written December
9, 2000, and told Chief Mathieu that his answer to the allegations was in the letter and that "I
don't see any need for me to go into the hearing." R. 2886. Harmon's letter to Chief Mathieu:
(1) admitted the Drafting Pit Incident, (2) denied urinating into a shower stall "since I have been
a Captain," (3) denied the Weedkiller Incident; and (4) said he did not need another hearing. R.
344.345; R. 2686.
39.

Harmon testified that after he gave the letter to Chief Mathieu he began to walk

away, but Chief Mathieu said "I want you in this meeting." R. 2686. Harmon said Chief
Mathieu told him "he had some questions about those allegations and he wants to get some
answersfromme. And I said, My answers are in that letter I gave you." R. 2686.
40.

In the second predetermination hearing, Chief Mathieu asked the following about

the Weedkiller Incident:
It has been reported to me that your former Battalion Chief asked for some of that
and in so doing, instead of providing weed killer, you provided him urine. Did
that occur?
R. 348. Harmon answered u[m]y response is in that letter also." R. 348. Harmon's response in
the letter was "I deny." See 345.
41.

At the Commission Hearing, Harmon testified that his denial in his letter about

the Weedkiller Incident also applied to questions asked in the second predetermination hearing.
R. 2763-64.

42..

Harmon testified that he did not provide urine to the battalion chief. R. 2770. He

testified that he denied that he had provided urine to a "former Battalion Chief because he did
not "provide" urine. R. 2768.
43.

Harmon testified that he answered the Weedkiller questions correctly because

Chief Mathieu had gotten the questions backwards and mixed up. R. 2769.
44.

Harmon admitted in the Commission Hearing that he had done the things that he

had denied doing in response to Chief Mathieu's question. See 2708-11,2773-75.
45.

Chief Mathieu testified at the Commission Hearing that when he questioned

Harmon about the Weedkiller Incident during the second predetermination hearing, he knew that
the incident had occurred and accordingly knew Harmon was not honest in his response. R.
1737-38.
V.

CHIEF MATHIEU'S TERMINATION DECISION.
46.

Ogden City Human Resources Manager Mr. Bristow testified at the Commission

Hearing that the City does not "have a pure progressive discipline system. Based on the severity
of the action, that action alone can be grounds for termination." R. 2228.
47.

Chief Mathieu testified at the Commission Hearing that in making the disciplinary

decision, he considered all of the offenses collectively: "In consideration, I considered all of the
offenses collectively. I didn't consider them individually." R. 1755.
48.

Chief Mathieu testified at the Commission Hearing that in making his disciplinary

decision, he took into account Harmon's poor past annual performance evaluations and his past
disciplinary history. R. 1972. He also reviewed areas in evaluations where Harmon was marked
as "marginal," including with regard to staying on-task, time management, and blaming others
when criticized. See R. 1973-2022.

49.

Chief Mathieu testified at the Commission hearing that he also considered what

he believed to be Harmon's dishonesty at the second predetermination hearing in denying the
Weedkiller Incident, where Chief Mathieu already had evidence that the incident had occurred.
R. 2373-75. He testified that he did not terminate Harmon solely on the basis of hisfindingthat
Harmon had lied, but also on his belief that Harmon "displayed an intent to be dishonest." R.
2607-08; 2373-75.
50.

Chief Mathieu testified at the Commission Hearing that he had never before had a

situation arise where an employee was "involved in an incident that in any way related to an
employee urinating on somebody, in something, around a place that was inappropriate," let alone
three such incidents, so that there was no one else to whom to compare Harmon's behavior. R.
2396-97.
51.

Chief Mathieu testified at the Commission Hearing that he made the decision to

terminate Harmon because he believed it was in the best interest of the City and the OFD. R.
2402. He testified that he felt that "there was much more than what was needed to terminate Dan
Harmon." R. 2607-08.
ARGUMENT
I.

LEGAL STANDARDS FOR REVIEW OF THE TERMINATION DECISION.
In remanding to the Commission to determine whether Chief Mathieu's decision to

terminate Harmon was appropriate as to severity, the Utah Court of Appeals provided some
instruction as to how to proceed. The Court instructed that, in general, the Commission is to
defer to the Chiefs decision:
In weighing the punishment against the offense, the Commission must give
deference to the chiefs choice of punishment because, as the head of the Fire
Department, he is in a position to balance the competing concerns in
pursuing a particular disciplinary action
('"[Discipline imposed for

employee misconduct is within the sound discretion of the [c]hief" . . . Likewise,
the Commission must give deference to the chiefs determination of whether
progressive discipline is appropriate
"[T]he use of progressive discipline is
committed to the [cjhief s discretion, based on the [c]hief s determination of the
severity of the offense."
Opinion, pp. 6-7 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
The Court also instructed that Chief Mathieu can be reversed only if the discipline was
"clearly disproportionate" to the offenses that have been identified, and the discipline is totally
unreasonable and irrational:
Given the degree of deference accorded to [Chief Mathieu's] determination, the
Commission may reverse the chiefs choice of discipline as unduly excessive
only when the punishment is "clearly disproportionate" to the offense...
and "exceeds the bounds of reasonableness and rationality.'"
Opinion, p. 7 (emphasis).
Finally, citing cases from other states, the Court provided some limited instruction as to
what factors might be used to "balance the proportionality of the punishment to the offense." See
Opinion, p. 7. Noting that there is little case law in Utah on this issue, the Court cited various
case law situations and stated:
We [Le., Utah courts] have noted that an exemplary service record and tenuous
evidence of misconduct may tip the balance against termination. On the other
hand, dishonesty or a series of violations accompanied by apparently ineffective
progressive discipline may support termination. Other courts have given weight
to considerations of: (a) whether the violation is directly related to the employee's
official duties and significantly impedes his or her ability to carry out those duties;
(b) whether the offense was of a type that adversely affects the public confidence
in the department; (c) whether the offense undermines the morale and
effectiveness of the department; or (d) whether the offense was committed
willfully or knowingly; rather than negligently or inadvertently. Courts have
further considered whether the misconduct is likely to reoccur.
Opinion, p. 7 (citations omitted).
Based on these standards, the Commission cannot legitimately find that Chief Mathieu's
decision to terminate Harmon is disproportionate or "exceeds the bounds of reasonableness and

rationality." The Commission accordingly should affirm Chief Mathieu's decision to terminate
Harmon.
II.

THE TERMINATION DECISION IS REASONABLE AND RATIONAL.
For the reasons set forth below, Chief Mathieu's decision to terminate Harmon was

rational, reasonable, appropriate and fully justified.
A.

The Sexually-Related Incidents Constitute Serious Misconduct

In evaluating the seriousness of Harmon's inappropriate misconduct regarding the
sexually-related incidents, it is important to consider sexual harassment laws, legal duties and
responsibilities of an employer with regard to inappropriate sexual conduct, and the City's
policies, which require reporting of "possible sexual harassment." State and federal
discrimination laws impose strict penalties on employers for allowing or condoning inappropriate
sexual conduct in the workplace. The goal of employers therefore is to stop sexual conduct
before it gets reaches the point of becoming legal sexual harassment. Under the Majority's
Opinion's position, however, any sexual conduct is appropriate as long as it appears the other
person is not offended. Since it is impossible to know beforehand whether someone will take
offense or change their mind later about whether they were offended, the Majority's position
amounts to an instruction that inappropriate sexual conduct must be permitted and tolerated in
the workplace unless or until someone complains or the employer is sued.
However, the Majority's apparent position on sexual conduct ignores two 1998 United
States Supreme Court cases4 which allow an employer to avoid liability for sexual harassment if
it "exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior."
The Majority's position also is inconsistent with a 2001 opinion by the Utah Court of Appeals,
4

Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. 2257 (1998); Faragher v. City of Boca
Raton, 118 S. Ct. 2275(1998).

AutolivASP. Inc., v. Department of Workforce Services, 2001 UT App 198, 29 P.3d 7, where the
court recognized "just cause" for termination of an employee who exposed his employer to
sexual harassment claims. In Autoliv, the court held that it was proper to deny unemployment
compensation to employees who were terminated for sending sexually explicit e-mails, noting
that sending of such materials:
exposes the employer to sexual harassment and sex discrimination lawsuits.
As the Utah Supreme Court stated in Retherford v. AT&T Communications of the
Mountain States, Inc., 844 P.2d 949 (Utah 1992), "our society has ceased seeing
sexual harassment in the workplace as a playful inevitability that should be taken
in good spirits and has awakened to the fact that sexual harassment has a corrosive
effect on those who engage in it as well as those who are subjected to it."
Autoliv, 2001 UT App. f 26, 29 P.3d 7 (emphasis added) (noting employees' conduct violated
"universal standard of conduct") (quoting Retherford, 844 P.2d at 978).
By contrast with the Court of Appeals teaching in Autoliv that exposing the employer to
sexual harassment or gender discrimination claims alone justifies termination and violates a
"universal standard of conduct," the Majority's opinion stands for the proposition that OFD is
prohibited from disciplining employees who engage in inappropriate sexual conduct unless that
conduct rises to the level of legally actionable sexual harassment. This strips OFD of its ability
to prevent sexual harassment from occurring. However, OFD clearly has the right to discipline
employees who engage in inappropriate sexual conduct or conversations in the workplace, such
as those engaged in by Harmon. Even more significant here, Harmon was a Captain and a
supervisor, and as such, he stood in the place of the employer and essentially was the "employer"
in a sexual harassment context so that his actions become the actions of the employer.
In addition, it is irrelevant that the Horseplay Incidents involved only males. A 1998
United States Supreme Court opinion, Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs.t Inc., 118 S. Ct. 998
(1998) (male/male sexual conduct), makes clear that same-gender sexual conduct can create

employer liability for sexual harassment. The Utah Supreme Court made the same decision in
1992 in Retherford v. AT&T Communications, 844 P.2d 949 (Utah 1992), which involved an
allegation that a female plaintiff was sexually harassed by female co-workers. The Majority thus
ignored that even if females are not participants or bystanders, the sexual conduct itself creates a
hostile work environment for other male employees. See id.
It is likewise irrelevant whether or not the activity was consensual or that it was
"common in the Department." Inappropriate sexual conduct is inappropriate regardless of
whether it is consensual or allegedly is "common," because it can create a hostile work
environment for everyone else exposed to it. Moreover, no one can know whether conduct is
truly "consensual," and such conduct frequently becomes the basis for later lawsuits. It is also
irrelevant that the conduct allegedly had gone on for many years. Once the conduct was
discovered, it was rightfully punished.
B.

Harmon's Urination Incidents Also Constitute Serious Misconduct.

In evaluating the seriousness of the Shower Incident, it is irrelevant whether it occurred
while Gunnell was a "subordinate" to Harmon, even though it was conclusively established that
Gunnell was a subordinate at the time of the incident because Gunnell was hired after Harmon
was hired. The Shower Incident is simply the first urination incident that came to light in a series
of misconduct involving Harmon's inappropriate urination. This in itself is a violation of the
'^universal standard of conduct" mentioned in Autoliv as being sufficient to create cause for
termination and to justify denial of unemployment benefits. It also is absurd for Harmon to
justify his urinating infrontof co-workers and subordinates by contending that he had an
urgency to go to the bathroom while he was at the drafting pit and it was "a pain" to get the key
to the restroom. In fact, this is reminiscent of Harmon's attempting to avoid responsibility for

the Weedkiller Incident by parsing words. In any event, Harmon's misconduct in urinating in
public in the Drafting Incident and in urinating in the weedkiller bottle are obviously
inappropriate and demonstrate a serious lack of judgment.
C.

Harmon's Dishonesty Alone Justifies His Termination.

Chief Mathieu believed that, during the second predetermination hearing, Harmon was
dishonest with him about the Weedkiller Incident. This in itself justifies Chief Mathieu's
decision to terminate Harmon. In a case decided in October 2004 involving a terminated Ogden
City police officer, the Utah Court of Appeals stated that a public safety officer's giving false
answers during an investigation is, by itself, sufficient to support a decision to terminate that
officer's employment* See Huemiller v. Ogden Civil Serv. Comm 'n, 2004 UT App. 375 (Oct.
28, 2004). Obviously, once the Fire Chief believes one of his Captains has been dishonest, it
destroys the level of trust that a Chief needs to have in his supervisors.
D.

As A Supervisor, Harmon Is Held To A Higher Level Of Conduct

It is undisputed that Harmon was a Captain and supervisor during at least the Weedkiller,
Zucchini, Drafting Pit, MDA, and Horseplay Incidents. As a Captain, he is held to a higher duty
and is expected to set the example for subordinates and those whom he supervises. Harmon
himself admitted at the first predetermination hearing that as a supervisor, he was responsible for
"workplace conduct of introductoryfirefighters"and that he set the example for "what is
acceptable and what is not acceptable" for his subordinates. R. 327. Similarly, at the
Commission Hearing, Harmon agreed: (I) "with the axiom a leader sets up, leads by example';
(2) "that a leader is assigned and takes responsibility, takes responsibility for his actions and is
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This is significant because, although Harmon is not a police officer, a fire department
supervisor might also be called to testify in court, and similarly might be subject to impeachment
in court on grounds that he had lied during an investigation.

always ready to be held accountable"; and (3) "the leader makes [] decisions based on his
judgment and, therefore, is also held accountable if something goes wrong." R. 2821-22.
Harmon also agreed at the Commission Hearing that "a captain is to be an example to his crew,"
(R. 1257), and that it was his "duty as a captain to train [a new] employee to know what is
appropriate and not appropriate in the Ogden City Fire Department." R. 1258. In light of these
admitted standards, Harmon's actions clearly set a poor example for other employees and for
those whom he supervised.
E.

Harmon's Conduct Had Deteriorated In The Years Prior To His
Termination.

Even though Harmon was a 20-year veteran of OFD, his conduct was not exemplary. In
fact, his evaluations had been inconsistent and frequently poor for over ten years. Harmon's
annual employee evaluations from February 17,1991 through March 2000, reflect that he
typically received mid-range marks, and wasfrequentlycautioned and received low marks for
failing to stay on-task and due to poor personal relations with co-workers. See R. 375-471
(evaluations); R. 1773-2022 (Comm. Hrg. Trans.).
From about 1995 through 2000, Harmon's performance deteriorated further. On
December 13, 1995, he received a Second Written Warning cautioning him about his poor work
performance, inefficient work habits, failure to discipline subordinates, conflicts with peer
supervisors, and failure to stay on-task, including failing to provide timely evaluations. R. 278,
388. His 1996 annual evaluation notes that he has "trouble working with others on a mutual
respect basis," and he received "marginal" scores in leadership, planning/organization, meeting
schedules/ utilizing resources, personnel management/interpersonal skills, and
flexibility/adaptability/initiative. R. 403-06. His March 3, 1997 annual evaluation expressed
concerns with his problems in "sizing up" and prioritizing tasks, and the evaluator was concerned

about his reliability. R. 439. In his March 3, 1998, annual evaluation, Harmon again received
"marginal" in the categories of planning/organization, and meeting schedules/utilizing resources.
See R. 446-54. On April 19, 1998, he was counseled about leaving his assigned location at a fire
without informing the Incident Commander. R. 444; R. 2014. In his 2000 evaluation, Harmon
scored only "marginal" for productivity/efficiency, and for meeting schedules/utilizing resources.
R. 466-67. In fact, the evaluator noted in Harmon's 2000 evaluation that although Harmon had
good leadership traits and his crew liked him, Harmon's crew did not trust him because he had
problems fulfilling his duties. R. 465.
In addition to the aforementioned poor evaluations, in the eighteen months prior to his
termination, Harmon had failed to attend four required meetings. On June 10, 1999, he did not
attend a workgroup leaders meeting, where he was a Team Leader, because he claims he "spaced
it." R. 458. On August 17,1999, he failed to attend a CPR class for reservists that he had
scheduled and where he was an instructor. R. 289. On September 18, 1999, Harmon did not
show up for Reserve Corps meeting that he set up as the Team Leader. R. 289. On November
11, 1999, he received a Notice of Caution for missing the 1999 meetings, and was removed as
Team Leader. R. 289. As afinalblow, on November 14, 2000, during the investigation that
culminated in his termination, Harmon failed to show up for a class he was supposed to teach,
even though it had been scheduled for eight months and was posted on OFD yearly and monthly
calendars. R. 473-74.
F.

In Summary, Chief Mathieu's Termination Decision Was Fully Justified.

Based on all of the foregoing, Chief Mathieu's decision to terminate Harmon was not
irrational or unreasonable. Chief Mathieu testified at the Commission Hearing that in making the
disciplinary decision, he considered all of the offenses collectively: "I considered all of the

offenses collectively. I didn't consider them individually." R. 1755. He further testified that he
had never before had a situation arise where an employee was "involved in an incident that in
any way related to an employee urinating on somebody, in something, around a place that was
inappropriate," let alone three such incidents, so that there was no one else to whom to compare
Harmon's behavior. R. 2396-97. Chief Mathieu also testified that in making his disciplinary
decision, he took into account Harmon's past annual performance evaluations and his past
disciplinary history. R. 1972. He also reviewed areas in evaluations where Harmon was marked
as "marginal," including with regard to staying on-task, time management, and blaming others
when criticized. See R. 1973-2022.
Chief Mathieu also told Commissioners that he took into account what he believed to be
Harmon's dishonesty at the second predetermination hearing in denying the Weedkiller Incident,
when Chief Mathieu already had evidence that the incident had occurred. R. 2373-75. He
further noted that he did not terminate Harmon solely on the basis of hisfindingthat Harmon had
lied, but also on his belief that Harmon had "displayed an intent to be dishonest." R. 2607-08;
2373-75.
According to Chief Mathieu's testimony at the Commission Hearing, he made the
decision to terminate Harmon because he believed it was in the best interest of the City and the
OFD (R. 2402), and that he felt that "there was much more than what was needed to terminate
Dan Harmon." R. 2607-08. Significantly, Ogden City Human Resources Manager Mr. Bristow
testified at the Commission Hearing that the City does not "have a pure progressive discipline
system. Based on the severity of the action, that action alone can be grounds for termination."
R. 2228. In this situation, Harmon's actions collectively establish that termination was the only

appropriate discipline. Indeed, Harmon himself failed to report any of the incidents and, in fact,
admitted that he was the person who sought to hide the photos taken at the MDA event.
Furthermore, the mitigating circumstances cited by the Court of Appeals have no
application here. Harmon does not have an "exemplary service record" and the evidence of
misconduct is not "tenuous." Moreover, the violations are "directly related to the [Harmon's]
official duties and significantly impedes his . . . ability to carry out those duties," since Harmon
was a Captain and his actions were such as to seriously impact the regard in which he would be
held by co-workers and subordinates. The offenses also were "of a type that adversely affect[]
the public confidence in the department," and were such that they "undermine[d] the morale and
effectiveness of the department." Finally, it is clear that the offenses were "committed willfully
or knowingly," and were not simply negligent or inadvertent.
In sum, Chief Mathieu's decision to terminate Harmon was not unreasonable or irrational.
Harmon's conduct was sexually-charged, inappropriate, offensive, deceptive, and completely
inappropriate for someone in his position. It was embarrassing to OFD, and placed OFD in a
poor light. Furthermore, Harmon did not have an otherwise exemplary record and, in fact, had
received poor evaluations and had been subject to discipline for over ten years prior to his
termination. This is not a situation where Chief Mathieu acted impulsively and without thought.
It is clear that he balanced the situation, and determined that it was not in the best interests of
OFD to continue to employ Harmon.
CONCLUSION
The Utah Court of Appeals instructed the Commission on remand is to consider only
whether Chief Mike Mathieu's decision to terminate Captain Daniel Harmon was
disproportionate to the offense, or irrational and unreasonable. Based on the foregoing, the City

respectfully submits that the Commission should find that the decision to terminate Harmon was
proper, and to defer to and affirm Chief Mathieu's termination decision.
DATED this 3rd day of January, 2006
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARITNEAU
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